The Experientiality of Matter

If there’s one thing that Nietzsche advocated for, it was to eliminate dogmatism and absolutism from one’s thinking.  And although I generally agree with him here, I do think that there is one exception to this rule.  One thing that we can be absolutely certain of is our own conscious experience.  Nietzsche actually had something to say about this (in Beyond Good and Evil, which I explored in a previous post), where he responds to Descartes’ famous adage “cogito ergo sum” (the very adage associated with my blog!), and he basically says that Descartes’ conclusion (“I think therefore I am”) shows a lack of reflection concerning the meaning of “I think”.  He wonders how he (and by extension, Descartes) could possibly know for sure that he was doing the thinking rather than the thought doing the thinking, and he even considers the possibility that what is generally described as thinking may actually be something more like willing or feeling or something else entirely.

Despite Nietzsche’s criticism against Descartes in terms of what thought is exactly or who or what actually does the thinking, we still can’t deny that there is thought.  Perhaps if we replace “I think therefore I am” with something more like “I am conscious, therefore (my) conscious experience exists”, then we can retain some core of Descartes’ insight while throwing out the ambiguities or uncertainties associated with how exactly one interprets that conscious experience.

So I’m in agreement with Nietzsche in the sense that we can’t be certain of any particular interpretation of our conscious experience, including whether or not there is an ego or a self (which Nietzsche actually describes as a childish superstition similar to the idea of a soul), nor can we make any certain inferences about the world’s causal relations stemming from that conscious experience.  Regardless of these limitations, we can still be sure that conscious experience exists, even if it can’t be ascribed to an “I” or a “self” or any particular identity (let alone a persistent identity).

Once we’re cognizant of this certainty, and if we’re able to crawl out of the well of solipsism and eventually build up a theory about reality (for pragmatic reasons at the very least), then we must remain aware of the priority of consciousness in any resultant theory we construct about reality, with regard to its structure or any of its other properties.  Personally, I believe that some form of naturalistic physicalism (a realistic physicalism) is the best candidate for an ontological theory that is the most parsimonious and explanatory for all that we experience in our reality.  However, most people that make the move to adopt some brand of physicalism seem to throw the baby out with the bathwater (so to speak), whereby consciousness gets eliminated by assuming it’s an illusion or that it’s not physical (therefore having no room for it in a physicalist theory, aside from its neurophysiological attributes).

Although I used to feel differently about consciousness (and it’s relationship to physicalism), where I thought it was plausible for it to be some kind of an illusion, upon further reflection I’ve come to realize that this was a rather ridiculous position to hold.  Consciousness can’t be an illusion in the proper sense of the word, because the experience of consciousness is real.  Even if I’m hallucinating where my perceptions don’t directly correspond with the actual incoming sensory information transduced through my body’s sensory receptors, then we can only say that the perceptions are illusory insofar as they don’t directly map onto that incoming sensory information.  But I still can’t say that having these experiences is itself an illusion.  And this is because consciousness is self-evident and experiential in that it constitutes whatever is experienced no matter what that experience consists of.

As for my thoughts on physicalism, I came to realize that positing consciousness as an intrinsic property of at least some kinds of physical material (analogous to a property like mass) allows us to avoid having to call consciousness non-physical.  If it is simply an experiential property of matter, that doesn’t negate its being a physical property of that matter.  It may be that we can’t access this property in such a way as to evaluate it with external instrumentation, like we can for all the other properties of matter that we know of such as mass, charge, spin, or what-have-you, but that doesn’t mean an experiential property should be off limits for any physicalist theory.  It’s just that most physicalists assume that everything can or has to be reducible to the externally accessible properties that our instrumentation can measure.  And this suggests that they’ve simply assumed that the physical can only include externally accessible properties of matter, rather than both internally and externally accessible properties of matter.

Now it’s easy to see why science might push philosophy in this direction because its methodology is largely grounded on third-party verification and a form of objectivity involving the ability to accurately quantify everything about a phenomenon with little or no regard for introspection or subjectivity.  And I think that this has caused many a philosopher to paint themselves into a corner by assuming that any ontological theory underlying the totality of our reality must be constrained in the same way that the physical sciences are.  To see why this is an unwarranted assumption, let’s consider a “black box” that can only be evaluated by a certain method externally.  It would be fallacious to conclude that just because we are unable to access the inside of the box, that the box must therefore be empty inside or that there can’t be anything substantially different inside the box compared to what is outside the box.

We can analogize this limitation of studying consciousness with our ability to study black holes within the field of astrophysics, where we’ve come to realize that accessing any information about their interior (aside from how much mass there is) is impossible to do from the outside.  And if we managed to access this information (if there is any) from the inside by leaping past its outer event horizon, it would be impossible for us to escape and share any of that information.  The best we can do is to learn what we can from the outside behavior of the black hole in terms of its interaction with surrounding matter and light and infer something about the inside, like how much matter it contains (e.g. we can infer the mass of a black hole from its outer surface area).  And we can learn a little bit more by considering what is needed to create or destroy a black hole, thus creating or destroying any interior qualities that may or may not exist.

A black hole can only form from certain configurations of matter, particularly aggregates that are above a certain mass and density.  And it can only be destroyed by starving it to death, by depriving it of any new matter, where it will slowly die by evaporating entirely into Hawking radiation, thus destroying anything that was on the inside in the process.  So we can infer that any internal qualities it does have, however inaccessible they may be, can be brought into and out of existence with certain physical processes.

Similarly, we can infer some things about consciousness by observing one’s external behavior including inferring some conditions that can create, modify, or destroy that type of consciousness, but we are unable to know what it’s like to be on the inside of that system once it exists.  We’re only able to know about the inside of our own conscious system, where we are in some sense inside our own black hole with nobody else able to access this perspective.  And I think it is easy enough to imagine that certain configurations of matter simply have an intrinsic, externally inaccessible experiential property, just as certain configurations of matter lead to the creation of a black hole with its own externally inaccessible and qualitatively unknown internal properties.  Despite the fact that we can’t access the black hole’s interior with a strictly external method, to determine its internal properties, this doesn’t mean we should assume that whatever properties may exist inside it are therefore fundamentally non-physical.  Just as we wouldn’t consider alternate dimensions (such as those predicted in M-theory/String-Theory) that we can’t physically access to be non-physical.  Perhaps one or more of these inaccessible dimensions (if they exist) is what accounts for an intrinsic experiential property within matter (though this is entirely speculative and need not be true for the previous points to hold, but it’s an interesting thought nevertheless).

Here’s a relevant quote from the philosopher Galen Strawson, where he outlines what physicalism actually entails:

Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving. They must at least embrace micropsychism. Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an ‘inference to the best explanation’… Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realistic physicalists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential. But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the big step has already been taken with micropsychism, the admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential. ‘And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us’ I think that the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are experiential would look like the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are spatio-temporal (on the assumption that spacetime is indeed a fundamental feature of reality). I would bet a lot against there being such radical heterogeneity at the very bottom of things. In fact (to disagree with my earlier self) it is hard to see why this view would not count as a form of dualism… So now I can say that physicalism, i.e. real physicalism, entails panexperientialism or panpsychism. All physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow, is an experience-involving phenomenon. This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of ‘substance dualism’… Real physicalism, realistic physicalism, entails panpsychism, and whatever problems are raised by this fact are problems a real physicalist must face.

— Galen Strawson, Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?
While I don’t believe that all matter has a mind per se, because a mind is generally conceived as being a complex information processing structure, I think it is likely that all matter has an experiential quality of some kind, even if most instantiations of it are entirely unrecognizable as what we’d generally consider to be “consciousness” or “mentality”.  I believe that the intuitive gap here is born from the fact that the only minds we are confident exist are those instantiated by a brain, which has the ability to make an incredibly large number of experiential discriminations between various causal relations, thus giving it a capacity that is incredibly complex and not observed anywhere else in nature.  On the other hand, a particle of matter on its own would be hypothesized to have the capacity to make only one or two of these kinds of discriminations, making it unintelligent and thus incapable of brain-like activity.  Once a person accepts that an experiential quality can come in varying degrees from say one experiential “bit” to billions or trillions of “bits” (or more), then we can plausibly see how matter could give rise to systems that have a vast range in their causal power, from rocks that don’t appear to do much at all, to living organisms that have the ability to store countless representations of causal relations (memory) allowing them to behave in increasingly complex ways.  And perhaps best of all, this approach solves the mind-body problem by eliminating the mystery of how fundamentally non-experiential stuff could possibly give rise to experientiality and consciousness.

5 thoughts on “The Experientiality of Matter

  1. There’s a sense in which I’m sympathetic to this position, but I wonder whether we even need to go as far as making the distinction of a different property. I have made similar arguments as what you’ve noted by positing a perspective rather than a property. So I think by acknowledging that there is a divide between the subjective and the objective perspectives, we could say that consciousness is a neurological process without it being illusory or requiring something new. Consciousness is the neurological process as experienced from within, and the scientific description of that neurological process is the experience from the outside. I would not be surprised if they can never be reconciled in some comprehensive description, but I do not see why that requires a new substance or even, as you have suggested, a new property. Or perhaps your ‘property’ is really no different than this thing I’m calling a perspective?

    • Well I think if an internal intrinsic aspect of matter is qualitatively different than any of its external aspects, then this means it is a different property. That’s what people generally mean by different properties — qualitative differences that are ascribed to something. Having said that, I’m in general agreement with your description of consciousness as being the neurological processes as experienced from within, but I wouldn’t describe the neurological processes themselves as the experience from the outside. The ability to have an experience at all is the internal intrinsic property of matter, and the neurological structure and processes involved with brain function describe the external physical material configuration making use of that internal quality (even if in order to experience this external structure, we are relying on our own brain’s internal experiential qualities). The key point of my position is that there are no separate substances (no dualism) and there is no emergence of an experiential property from non-experiential stuff. Instead there is only one substance (matter/energy) and it has two primary sets of qualities/properties at all times: experiential properties and non-experiential properties. And if the configuration of the matter involved is relatively complex and able to process information, then the experiential quality that results is what we tend to think of as consciousness. If the configuration is not made this way, then you still get some elementary experiential quality but without any intelligence (like that which would result from the configuration of matter found in something like a rock).

      This kind of view allows us to have matter that can be either intelligent or unintelligent (which we see in nature) without positing any kind of magic supervenience or magic emergence, and it allows us to maintain the empirically validated position of there being no such thing as disembodied minds (such as those posited for gods or anything supernatural). It’s the most consistent and parsimonious ontological position that I’ve found thus far…

      • Sorry for the slow response. I think our conceptions here are probably very similar, but I’m still hesitant to identify new properties. I want to say that the same essential features of matter-energy produce both the internal experience (consciousness) and the external experience (neurological processes), but that the experiences are qualitatively different because of the perspective, not because of differing access to distinct properties. Maybe another, more philosophical, way to put it is to suggest that the appearance of there being different properties is epistemological and not ontological. Does that make sense?

      • Maybe another, more philosophical, way to put it is to suggest that the appearance of there being different properties is epistemological and not ontological.

        But our ontology is based on those epistemological limitations, so if it appears a certain way then we must accept that there is an underlying ontological foundation for that appearance, unless we have good evidence and reasoning to believe otherwise. In the end, I think if experiential and non-experiential qualities of matter can’t be considered to be different properties, then what can? What could possibly be more distinct than experientiality and non-experientiality? Anything else that you would actually consider to be a property of this or that object/entity is (in my opinion) going to be less distinct than this dichotomy of qualities, so then arguing a fortiori, experientiality and non-experientiality should be considered as distinct properties as well. It seems to be the most elemental way of splitting up all properties prior to splitting them up further into more and more specific properties. You start with experientiality and non-experientiality, and then every other property is simply a member of one of those two parent sets.

        If you apply your kind of eliminativism to any other properties, you could say that they are just different perspectives of some other/single property or object, which ends up simply throwing the baby out with the bathwater, by then effectively eliminating all properties — i.e. “Color and mass aren’t really properties or aren’t distinct properties, for they are just different perspectives of the same property/object…”

      • …that the experiences are qualitatively different because of the perspective, not because of differing access to distinct properties…

        Furthermore, experientiality is contingent on access to something distinct. I’m not able to access the experiential qualities of any matter except that which is involved in my neurological processes. I have no access to your matter’s or any other matter’s experiential qualities (even if I do have access to the non-experiential qualities related to your actions that result from or accompany those experiential qualities). This means that there’s something that exists externally from me that is distinct from what I’m able to access externally. In any case, even another entity simply having an interior that is distinct from its exterior (like our bodies) can be considered as different properties of that entity, even if a particular perspective is needed to access each one. The fact that a different perspective results in an apparent qualitative difference is itself a property as well, so I don’t think there’s any way around the differentiating between experiential and non-experiential properties. My two cents anyway…

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