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Transcendental Argument For God’s Existence: A Critique

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Theist apologists and theologians have presented many arguments for the existence of God throughout history including the Ontological Argument, Cosmological Argument, Fine-Tuning Argument, the Argument from Morality, and many others — all of which having been refuted with various counter arguments.  I’ve written about a few of these arguments in the past (1, 2, 3), but one that I haven’t yet touched on is that of the Transcendental Argument for God (or simply TAG).  Not long ago I heard the Christian apologist Matt Slick conversing/debating with the well renowned atheist Matt Dillahunty on this topic and then I decided to look deeper into the argument as Slick presents it on his website.  I have found a number of problems with his argument, so I decided to iterate them in this post.

Slick’s basic argument goes as follows:

  1. The Laws of Logic exist.
    1. Law of Identity: Something (A) is what it is and is not what it is not (i.e. A is A and A is not not-A).
    2. Law of Non-contradiction: A cannot be both A and not-A, or in other words, something cannot be both true and false at the same time.
    3. Law of the Excluded Middle: Something must either be A or not-A without a middle ground, or in other words, something must be either true or false without a middle ground.
  2. The Laws of Logic are conceptual by nature — are not dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature.
  3. They are not the product of the physical universe (space, time, matter) because if the physical universe were to disappear, The Laws of Logic would still be true.
  4. The Laws of Logic are not the product of human minds because human minds are different — not absolute.
  5. But, since the Laws of Logic are always true everywhere and not dependent on human minds, it must be an absolute transcendent mind that is authoring them.  This mind is called God.
  6. Furthermore, if there are only two options to account for something, i.e., God and no God, and one of them is negated, then by default the other position is validated.
  7. Therefore, part of the argument is that the atheist position cannot account for the existence of The Laws of Logic from its worldview.
  8. Therefore God exists.

Concepts are Dependent on and the Product of Physical Brains

Let’s begin with number 2, 3, and 4 from above:

The Laws of Logic are conceptual by nature — are not dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature.  They are not the product of the physical universe (space, time, matter) because if the physical universe were to disappear, The Laws of Logic would still be true.  The Laws of Logic are not the product of human minds because human minds are different — not absolute.

Now I’d like to first mention that Matt Dillahunty actually rejected the first part of Slick’s premise here, as Dillahunty explained that while logic (the concept, our application of it, etc.) may in fact be conceptual in nature, the logical absolutes themselves (i.e. the laws of logic) which logic is based on are in fact neither conceptual nor physical.  My understanding of what Dillahunty was getting at here is that he was basically saying that just as the concept of an apple points to or refers to something real (i.e. a real apple) which is not equivalent to the concept of an apple, so also does the concept of the logical absolutes refer to something that is not the same as the concept itself.  However, what it points to, Dillahunty asserted, is something that isn’t physical either.  Therefore, the logical absolutes themselves are neither physical nor conceptual (as a result, Dillahunty later labeled “the essence” of the LOL as transcendent).  When Dillahunty was pressed by Slick to answer the question, “then what caused the LOL to exist?”, Dillahunty responded by saying that nothing caused them (or we have no reason to believe so) because they are transcendent and are thus not a product of anything physical nor conceptual.

If this is truly the case, then Dillahunty’s point here does undermine the validity of the logical structure of Slick’s argument, because Slick would then be beginning his argument by referencing the content and the truth of the logical absolutes themselves, and then later on switching to the concept of the LOL (i.e. their being conceptual in their nature, etc.).  For the purposes of this post, I’m going to simply accept Slick’s dichotomy that the logical absolutes (i.e. the laws of logic) are in fact either physical or conceptual by nature and then I will attempt to refute the argument anyway.  This way, if “conceptual or physical” is actually a true dichotomy (i.e. if there are no other options), despite the fact that Slick hasn’t proven this to be the case, his argument will be undermined anyway.  If Dillahunty is correct and “conceptual or physical” isn’t a true dichotomy, then even if my refutation here fails, Slick’s argument will still be logically invalid based on the points Dillahunty raised.

I will say however that I don’t think I agree with the point that Dillahunty made that the LOL are neither physical nor conceptual, and for a few reasons (not least of all because I am a physicalist).  My reasons for this will become more clear throughout the rest of this post, but in a nutshell, I hold that concepts are ultimately based on and thus are a subset of the physical, and the LOL would be no exception to this.  Beyond the issue of concepts, I believe that the LOL are physical in their nature for a number of other reasons as well which I’ll get to in a moment.

So why does Slick think that the LOL can’t be dependent on space?  Slick mentions in the expanded form of his argument that:

They do not stop being true dependent on location. If we travel a million light years in a direction, The Laws of Logic are still true.

Sure, the LOL don’t depend on a specific location in space, but that doesn’t mean that they aren’t dependent on space in general.  I would actually argue that concepts are abstractions that are dependent on the brains that create them based on those brains having recognized properties of space, time, and matter/energy.  That is to say that any concept such as the number 3 or the concept of redness is in fact dependent on a brain having recognized, for example, a quantity of discrete objects (which when generalized leads to the concept of numbers) or having recognized the color red in various objects (which when generalized leads to the concept of red or redness).  Since a quantity of discrete objects or a color must be located in some kind of space — even if three points on a one dimensional line (in the case of the number 3), or a two-dimensional red-colored plane (in the case of redness), then we can see that these concepts are ultimately dependent on space and matter/energy (of some kind).  Even if we say that concepts such as the color red or the number 3 do not literally exist in actual space nor are made of actual matter, they do have to exist in a mental space as mental objects, just as our conception of an apple floating in empty space doesn’t actually lie in space nor is made of matter, it nevertheless exists as a mental/perceptual representation of real space and real matter/energy that has been experienced by interaction with the physical universe.

Slick also mentions in the expanded form of his argument that the LOL can’t be dependent on time because:

They do not stop being true dependent on time. If we travel a billion years in the future or past, The Laws of Logic are still true.

Once again, sure, the LOL do not depend on a specific time, but rather they are dependent on time in general, because minds depend on time in order to have any experience of said concepts at all.  So not only are concepts only able to be formed by a brain that has created abstractions from physically interacting with space, matter, and energy within time (so far as we know), but the mind/concept-generating brain itself is also made of actual matter/energy, lying in real space, and operating/functioning within time.  So concepts are in fact not only dependent on space, time, and matter/energy (so far as we know), but are in fact also the product of space, time, and matter/energy, since it is only certain configurations of such that in fact produce a brain and the mind that results from said brain.  Thus, if the LOL are conceptual, then they are ultimately the product of and dependent on the physical.

Can Truth Exist Without Brains and a Universe?  Can Identities Exist Without a Universe?  I Don’t Think So…

Since Slick himself even claims that The Laws of Logic (LOL) are conceptual by nature, then that would mean that they are in fact also dependent on and the product of the physical universe, and more specifically are dependent on and the product of the human mind (or natural minds in general which are produced by a physical brain).  Slick goes on to say that the LOL can’t be dependent on the physical universe (which contains the brains needed to think or produce those concepts) because “…if the physical universe were to disappear, The Laws of Logic would still be true.”  It seems to me that without a physical universe, there wouldn’t be any “somethings” with any identities at all and so the Law of Identity which is the root of the other LOL wouldn’t apply to anything because there wouldn’t be anything and thus no existing identities.  Therefore, to say that the LOL are true sans a physical universe would be meaningless because identities themselves wouldn’t exist without a physical universe.  One might argue that abstract identities would still exist (like numbers or properties), but abstractions are products of a mind and thus need a brain to exist (so far as we know).  If one argued that supernatural identities would still exist without a physical universe, this would be nothing more than an ad hoc metaphysical assertion about the existence of the supernatural which carries a large burden of proof that can’t be (or at least hasn’t been) met.  Beyond that, if at least one of the supernatural identities was claimed to be God, this would also be begging the question.  This leads me to believe that the LOL are in fact a property of the physical universe (and appear to be a necessary one at that).

And if truth is itself just another concept, it too is dependent on minds and by extension the physical brains that produce those minds (as mentioned earlier).  In fact, the LOL seem to be required for any rational thought at all (hence why they are often referred to as the Laws of Thought), including the determination of any truth value at all.  So our ability to establish the truth value of the LOL (or the truth of anything for that matter) is also contingent on our presupposing the LOL in the first place.  So if there were no minds to presuppose the very LOL that are needed to establish its truth value, then could one say that they would be true anyway?  Wouldn’t this be analogous to saying that 1 + 1 = 2 would still be true even if numbers and addition (constructs of the mind) didn’t exist?  I’m just not sure that truth can exist in the absence of any minds and any physical universe.  I think that just as physical laws are descriptions of how the universe changes over time, these Laws of Thought are descriptions that underlie what our rational thought is based on, and thus how we arrive at the concept of truth at all.  If rational thought ceases to exist in the absence of a physical universe (since there are no longer any brains/minds), then the descriptions that underlie that rational thought (as well as their truth value) also cease to exist.

Can Two Different Things Have Something Fundamental in Common?

Slick then erroneously claims that the LOL can’t be the product of human minds because human minds are different and thus aren’t absolute, apparently not realizing that even though human minds are different from one another in many ways, they also have a lot fundamentally in common, such as how they process information and how they form concepts about the reality they interact with generally.  Even though our minds differ from one another in a number of ways, we nevertheless only have evidence to support the claim that human brains produce concepts and process information in the same general way at the most fundamental neurological level.  For example, the evidence suggests that the concept of the color red is based on the neurological processing of a certain range of wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation that have been absorbed by the eye’s retinal cells at some point in the past.  However, in Slick’s defense, I’ll admit that it could be the case that what I experience as the color red may be what you would call the color blue, and this would in fact suggest that concepts that we think we mutually understand are actually understood or experienced differently in a way that we can’t currently verify (since I can’t get in your mind and compare it to my own experience, and vice versa).

Nevertheless, just because our minds may experience color differently from one another or just because we may differ slightly in terms of what range of shades/tints of color we’d like to label as red, this does not mean that our brains/minds (or natural minds in general) are not responsible for producing the concept of red, nor does it mean that we don’t all produce that concept in the same general way.  The number 3 is perhaps a better example of a concept that is actually shared by humans in an absolute sense, because it is a concept that isn’t dependent on specific qualia (like the color red is).  The concept of the number 3 has a universal meaning in the human mind since it is derived from the generalization of a quantity of three discrete objects (which is independent of how any three specific objects are experienced in terms of their respective qualia).

Human Brains Have an Absolute Fundamental Neurology Which Encompasses the LOL

So I see no reason to believe that human minds differ at all in their conception of the LOL, especially if this is the foundation for rational thought (and thus any coherent concept formed by our brains).  In fact, I also believe that the evidence within the neurosciences suggests that the way the brain recognizes different patterns and thus forms different/unique concepts and such is dependent on the fact that the brain uses a hardware configuration schema that encompasses the logical absolutes.  In a previous post, my contention was that:

Additionally, if the brain’s wiring has evolved in order to see dimensions of difference in the world (unique sensory/perceptual patterns that is, such as quantity, colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.), then it would make sense that the brain can give any particular pattern an identity by having a unique schema of hardware or unique use of said hardware to perceive such a pattern and distinguish it from other patterns.  After the brain does this, the patterns are then arguably organized by the logical absolutes.  For example, if the hardware scheme or process used to detect a particular pattern “A” exists and all other patterns we perceive have or are given their own unique hardware-based identity (i.e. “not-A” a.k.a. B, C, D, etc.), then the brain would effectively be wired such that pattern “A” = pattern “A” (law of identity), any other pattern which we can call “not-A” does not equal pattern “A” (law of non-contradiction), and any pattern must either be “A” or some other pattern even if brand new, which we can also call “not-A” (law of the excluded middle).  So by the brain giving a pattern a physical identity (i.e. a specific type of hardware configuration in our brain that when activated, represents a detection of one specific pattern), our brains effectively produce the logical absolutes by nature of the brain’s innate wiring strategy which it uses to distinguish one pattern from another.  So although it may be true that there can’t be any patterns stored in the brain until after learning begins (through sensory experience), the fact that the DNA-mediated brain wiring strategy inherently involves eventually giving a particular learned pattern a unique neurological hardware identity to distinguish it from other stored patterns, suggests that the logical absolutes themselves are an innate and implicit property of how the brain stores recognized patterns.

So I believe that our brain produces and distinguishes these different “object” identities by having a neurological scheme that represents each perceived identity (each object) with a unique set of neurons that function in a unique way and thus which have their own unique identity.  Therefore, it would seem that the absolute nature of the LOL can easily be explained by how the brain naturally encompasses them through its fundamental hardware schema.  In other words, my contention is that our brain uses this wiring schema because it is the only way that it can be wired to make any discriminations at all and validly distinguish one identity from another in perception and thought, and this ability to discriminate various aspects of reality would be evolutionarily naturally-selected for based on the brain accurately modeling properties of the universe (in this case different identities/objects/causal-interactions existing) as it interacts with that environment via our sensory organs.  Which would imply that the existence of discrete identities is a property of the physical universe, and the LOL would simply be a description of what identities are.  This would explain why we see the LOL as absolute and fundamental and presuppose them.  Our brains simply encompass them in the most fundamental aspect of our neurology as it is a fundamental physical property of the universe that our brains model.

I believe that this is one of the reasons that Dillahunty and others believe that the LOL are transcendent (neither physical nor conceptual), because natural brains/minds are neurologically incapable of imagining a world existing without them.  The problem then only occurs because Dillahunty is abstracting a hypothetical non-physical world or mode of existence, yet doesn’t realize that he is unable to remove every physical property from any abstracted world or imagined mode of existence.  In this case, the physical property that he is unable to remove from his hypothetical non-physical world is his own neurological foundation, the very foundation that underlies all concepts (including that of existential identities) and which underlies all rational thought.  I may be incorrect about Dillahunty’s position here, but this is what I’ve inferred anyway based on what I’ve heard him say while conversing with Slick about this topic.

Human (Natural) Minds Can’t Account for the LOL, But Disembodied Minds Can?

Slick even goes on to say in point 5 that:

But, since the Laws of Logic are always true everywhere and not dependent on human minds, it must be an absolute transcendent mind that is authoring them.  This mind is called God.

We can see here that he concedes that the LOL is in fact the product of a mind, only he rejects the possibility that it could be a human mind (and by implication any kind of natural mind).  Rather, he insists that it must be a transcendent mind of some kind, which he calls God.  The problem with this conclusion is that we have no evidence or argument that demonstrates that minds can exist without physical brains existing in physical space within time.  To assume so is simply to beg the question.  Thus, he is throwing in an ontological/metaphysical assumption of substance dualism as well as that of disembodied minds, not only claiming that there must exist some kind of supernatural substance, but that this mysterious “non-physical” substance also has the ability to constitute a mind, and somehow do so without any dependence on time (even though mental function and thinking is itself a temporal process).  He assumes all of this of course without providing any explanation of how this mind could work even in principle without being made of any kind of stuff, without being located in any kind of space, and without existing in any kind of time.  As I’ve mentioned elsewhere concerning the ad hoc concept of disembodied minds:

…the only concept of a mind that makes any sense at all is that which involves the properties of causality, time, change, space, and material, because minds result from particular physical processes involving a very complex configuration of physical materials.  That is, minds appear to be necessarily complex in terms of their physical structure (i.e. brains), and so trying to conceive of a mind that doesn’t have any physical parts at all, let alone a complex arrangement of said parts, is simply absurd (let alone a mind that can function without time, change, space, etc.).  At best, we are left with an ad hoc, unintelligible combination of properties without any underlying machinery or mechanism.

In summary, I believe Slick has made several errors in his reasoning, with the most egregious being his unfounded assumption that natural minds aren’t capable of producing an absolute concept such as the LOL simply because natural minds have differences between one another (not realizing that all minds have fundamental commonalities), and also his argument’s reliance on the assumption that an ad hoc disembodied mind not only exists (whatever that could possibly mean) but that this mind can somehow account for the LOL in a way that natural minds can not, which is nothing more than an argument from ignorance, a logical fallacy.  He also insists that the Laws of Logic would be true without any physical universe, not realizing that the truth value of the Laws of Logic can only be determined by presupposing the Laws of Logic in the first place, which is circular, thus showing that the truth value of the Laws of Logic can’t be used to prove that they are metaphysically transcendent in any way (even if they actually happen to be metaphysically transcendent).  Lastly, without a physical universe of any kind, I don’t see how identities themselves can exist, and identities seem to be required in order for the LOL to be meaningful at all.

DNA & Information: A Response to an Old ID Myth

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A common myth that goes around in Intelligent Design (creationist) circles is the idea that DNA can only degrade over time, and thus any and all mutations are claimed to be harmful and only serve to reduce “information” stored in that DNA.  The claim is specifically meant to suggest that evolution from a common ancestor is impossible by naturalistic processes because DNA wouldn’t have been able to form in the first place and/or it wouldn’t be able to grow or change to allow for speciation.  Thus, the claim implies that either an intelligent designer had to intervene and guide evolution every step of the way (by creating DNA, fixing mutations as they occurred or preventing them from happening, and then ceasing this intervention as soon as scientists began studying genetics), or it implies that all organisms must have been created all at once by an intelligent designer with DNA that was “intelligently” designed to fail and degrade over time (thus questioning the intelligence of this designer).

These claims have been refuted a number of times over the years by the scientific community with a consensus that’s been drawn from years of research in evolutionary biology among other disciplines, and the claims seem to be mostly a result of fundamental misunderstandings of biology (or intentional misrepresentations of the facts) and also the result of an improper application of information theory to biological processes.  What’s unfortunate is that these claims are still circulating around, largely because the propagators aren’t interested in reason, evidence, or anything that may threaten their beliefs in the supernatural, and so they simply repeat this non-sense to others without fact checking them and without any consideration as to whether the claims even appear to be rational or logically sound at all.

After having recently engaged in a discussion with a Christian that made this very claim (among many other unsubstantiated, faith-based assertions), I figured it would be useful to demonstrate why this claim is so easily refutable based on some simple thought experiments as well as some explanations and evidence found in the actual biological sciences.  First, let’s consider a strand of DNA with the following 12 nucleotide sequence (split into triplets for convenience):


If a random mutation occurs in this strand during replication, say, at the end of the strand, thus turning Guanine (G) to Adenine (A), then we’d have:


If another random mutation occurs in this string during replication, say, at the end of the string once again, thus turning Adenine (A) back to Guanine (G), then we’d have the original nucleotide sequence once again.  This shows how two random mutations could lead to the same original strand of genetic information, thus showing how it can lose its original information and have it re-created once again.  It’s also relevant to note that because there are 64 possible codons produced from the four available nucleotides (4^3 = 64), and since only 20 amino acids are needed to make proteins, there are actually several codons that code for any individual amino acid.

In the case given above, the complementary RNA sequence produced for the two sequences (before and after mutation) would be:

UGA-CUG-ACU-GUC (before mutation)
UGA-CUG-ACU-GUU (after mutation)

It turns out that GUC and GUU (the last triplets in these sequences) are both codons that code for the same amino acid (Valine), thus showing how a silent mutation can occur as well, where a silent mutation is one in which there are no changes to the amino acids or subsequent proteins that the sequence codes for (and thus no functional change in the organism at all).  The fact that silent mutations even exist also shows how mutations don’t necessarily result in a loss or change of information at all.  So in this case, as a result of the two mutations, the end result was no change in the information at all.  Had the two strands been different such that they actually coded for different proteins after the initial mutation, then the second mutation would have reversed this problem anyway thus re-creating the original information that was lost.  So this demonstration in itself already refutes the claim that DNA can only lose information over time, or that mutations necessarily lead to a loss of information.  All one needs are random mutations, and there will always be a chance that some information is lost and then re-created.  Furthermore, if we had started with a strand that didn’t code for any amino acid at all in the last triplet, and then the random mutation changed it such that it did code for an amino acid (such as Valine), this would be an increase in information regardless (since a new amino acid was expressed that was previously absent), although this depends on how we define information (more on that in a minute).

Now we could ask, is the mutation valuable, that is, conducive to the survival of the organism?  That would entirely depend on the internal/external environment of that organism.  If we changed the diet of the organism or the other conditions in which it lived, we could arrive at opposite conclusions.  Which goes to show that of the mutations that aren’t neutral (most mutations are neutral), those that are harmful or beneficial are often so because of the specific internal/external environment under consideration. If an organism is able to digest lactose exclusively and it undergoes a mutation that provides some novel ability of digesting sucrose at the expense of digesting lactose a little less effectively than before, this would be a harmful mutation if the organism lived in an environment with lactose as the only available sugar.  If however, the organism was already in an environment that had more sucrose than lactose available, then the mutation would obviously be beneficial for now the organism could exploit the most available food source.  This would likely lead to that mutation being naturally selected for and increasing its frequency in the gene pool of that organism’s local population.

Another thing that is often glossed over with the Intelligent Design (ID) claims about genetic information being lost is the fact that they first have to define what exactly information is necessarily before presenting the rest of their argument.  Whether or not information is gained or lost requires knowing how to measure information in the first place.  This is where other problems begin to surface with ID claims like these because they tend to leave this definition either poorly defined, ambiguous or conveniently malleable to serve the interests of their argument.  What we need is a clear and consistent definition of information, and then we need to check that the particular definition given is actually applicable to biological systems, and then we can check to see if the claim is true.  I have yet to see this actually demonstrated successfully.  I was able to avoid this problem in my example above, because no matter how information is defined, it was shown that two mutations can lead to the original nucleotide sequence (whatever amount of genetic “information” that may have been).  If the information had been lost, it was recreated, and if it wasn’t technically lost at all during the mutation, then it shows that not all mutations lead to a loss of information.

I would argue that a fairly useful and consistent way to define information in terms of its application to describing the evolving genetics of biological organisms would be to describe it as any positive correlation between the functionality that the genetic sequences code for and the attributes of the environment that the organism is contained in.  This is useful because it represents the relationship between the genes and the environment and it seems to fit in line with the most well-established models in evolutionary biology, including the fundamental concept of natural selection leading to favored genotypes.

If an organism has a genetic sequence such that it can digest lactose (as per my previous example), and it is within an environment that has a supply of lactose available, then whatever genes are responsible for that functionality are effectively a form of information that describes or represents some real aspects of the organism’s environment (sources of energy, chemical composition, etc.).  The more genes that do this, that is, the more complex and specific the correlation, the more information there is in the organism’s genome.  So for example, if we consider the aforementioned mutation that caused the organism to develop a novel ability to digest sucrose in addition to lactose, then if it is in an environment that has both lactose and sucrose, this genome has even more environmental information stored within it because of the increased correlation between that genome and the environment.  If the organism can most efficiently digest a certain proportion of lactose versus sucrose, then if this optimized proportion evolves to approach the actual proportion of sugars in the environment around that organism (e.g. 30% lactose, 70% sucrose), then once again we have an increase in the amount of environmental information contained within its genome due to the increase in specificity.

Defining information in this way allows us to measure degrees of how well-adapted a particular organism is (even if only one trait or attribute at a time) to its current environment as well as its past environment (based on what the convergent evidence suggests) and it also provides at least one way to measure how genetically complex the organism is.

So not only are the ID claims about genetic information easily refuted with the inherent nature of random mutations and natural selection, but we can also see that the claims are further refuted once we define genetic information such that it encompasses the fundamental relationship between genes and the environment they evolve in.

Sustainability, Happiness, and a Science of Morality: Part II

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In the first part of this post, I briefly went over some of the larger problems that our global society is currently facing, including the problem of overpopulation and the overall lack of environmental and economic sustainability.  I also mentioned some of the systematic and ideological (including religious and political) barriers that will need to be overcome before we can make any considerable progress in obtaining a sustainable future.

Although it may seem hopeless at times, I believe that we human beings – despite our cognitive biases and vulnerability to irrational and dogmatic behaviors – have an innate moral core in common that is driven by the incentive to increase our level of overall satisfaction and fulfillment in life. When people feel like they are living more fulfilling lives, they want to continue if not amplify the behavior that’s leading to that satisfaction. If a person is shown ways that lead to greater satisfaction and they are able to experience even a slight though noticeable improvement as a result of those prescriptions, I believe that even irrational and dogmatic people do begin to explore outside of their ideological box.

More importantly however, if everyone is shown that their level of satisfaction and fulfillment in life is ultimately a result of their doing what they feel they ought to do above all else (which is morality in a nutshell), then they can begin to recognize the importance and efficacy of basing those oughts on well-informed facts about the world. In other words, people can begin to universally derive every moral ought from a well-informed is, thus formulating their morality based on facts and empirical data and grounded on reason – as opposed to basing their morality on dogmatic and other unreliable beliefs in the supernatural. It’s easy for people to disagree on morals that are based on dogma and the supernatural, because those supernatural beliefs and sources of dogma vary so much from one culture and religion to another, but morals become common if not universal (in at least some cases) when they are based on facts about the world (including objective physical and psychological consequences not only for the person performing the moral action, but also for anyone on the receiving end of that moral action).

Moral Imperatives & Happiness

Science has slowly but surely been uncovering (or at least better approximating) what kinds of behaviors lead to the greatest levels of happiness and overall satisfaction in the collective lives of everyone in society. Since all morals arguably reduce to a special type of hypothetical imperative (i.e. if your fundamental goal is X, then you ought to do Y above all else), and since all goals ultimately reduce to the fundamental goal of increasing one’s life satisfaction and fulfillment, then there exist objective moral facts, whereby if they were known, they would inform a person of which behaviors they ought to do above all else in order to increase their happiness and fulfillment in life. Science may never be able to determine exactly what these objective moral facts are, but it is certainly logical to assume that they exist, namely some ideal set of behaviors for people (at least, those that are sane and non-psychopathic) which, if we only knew what those ideal behaviors were, they would necessarily lead to maximized satisfaction within every person’s life (a concept that has been proposed by many philosophers, and one which has been very well defended in Richard Carrier’s Goal Theory of Ethics).

What science can do however, and arguably what it has already been doing, is to continue to better approximate what these objective moral facts are as we accumulate more knowledge and evidence in psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and even other fields such as economics. What science appears to have found thus far is (among other things) a confirmation of what Aristotle had asserted over two thousand years ago, namely the importance of cultivating what have often been called moral virtues (such as compassion, honesty, and reasonableness), in order to achieve what the Greeks called eudaimonia, or an ultimate happiness with one’s life. This makes perfect sense because cultivating these virtues leads to a person feeling good while exercising behaviors that are also beneficial to everyone else, so then benefiting others is rarely if ever going to feel like a chore (which is an unfortunate side-effect of exclusively employing the moral duty mentality under Kant’s famous deontological ethical framework). Combine this virtue cultivation with the plethora of knowledge about the consequences of our actions that the sciences have been accumulating, thus integrating in John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian or teleological/consequentialist ethical framework, and then we have a good ethical framework that should work very effectively in leading us toward a future where more and more people are happy, fulfilled, and doing what is best for sustaining that happiness in one another, including sustaining the environment that their happiness is dependent on.

A Science of Morality

To give a fairly basic but good example of where science is leading us in terms of morality, consider the fact that science has shown that when people try to achieve ever-increasing levels of wealth at the expense of others, they are doing so because those people believe that wealth will bring them the most satisfaction in life, and thus they believe that maximizing that wealth will bring maximal happiness. However, this belief is incorrect for a number of reasons. For one, studies in psychology have shown that there is a diminishing return of happiness when one increases their income and wealth – which sharply diminishes once a person exceeds an income of about $70K per year (in U.S. dollars / purchasing power). So the idea that increasing one’s income or wealth will indefinitely increase their happiness isn’t supported by the evidence. At best, it has a limited effect on happiness that only works up to a point.

Beyond this, psychology has also shown that there are much more effective ways of increasing happiness, such as cultivating the aforementioned virtues (e.g. compassion, integrity, honesty, reasonableness, etc.) and exercising them while helping others, which leads to internal psychological benefits (which neuroscience can and has quantified to some degree) and also external sociological benefits such as the formation of meaningful relationships which in turn provide even more happiness over time. If we also take into account the amount of time and effort often required to earn more income and wealth (with the intention of producing happiness), it can be shown that the time and effort would have been better spent on trying to form meaningful relationships and cultivating various virtues. Furthermore, if those people gaining wealth could see first hand the negative side-effects that their accumulation of wealth has on many others (such as increased poverty), then doing so would no longer make them as happy. So indeed it can be shown that their belief of what they think maximizes their satisfaction is false, and it can also be shown that there are in fact better ways to increase their happiness and life satisfaction more than they ever thought possible. Perhaps most importantly, it can be shown that the ways to make them happiest also serve to make everyone else happier too.

A Clear Path to Maximizing (Sustainable) Happiness

Perhaps if we begin to invest more in the development and propagation of a science of morality, we’ll start to see many societal problems dissolve away simply because more and more people will begin to realize that the reason why we all think that certain actions are moral actions (i.e. that we ought to do them above all else), is because we feel that doing those actions brings us the most happy and fulfilling lives. If people are then shown much more effective ways that they can increase their happiness and fulfillment, including by maximizing their ability to help others achieve the same ends, then they’re extremely likely to follow those prescribed ways of living, for it could be shown that not doing so would prevent them from gaining the very maximal happiness and fulfillment that they are ultimately striving for. The only reason people wouldn’t heed such advice then is because they are being irrational, which means we need to simultaneously work on educating everyone about our cognitive biases, how to spot logical fallacies and avoid making them, etc.  So then solving society’s problems, such as overpopulation, socioeconomic inequality, or unsustainability, boils down to every individual as well as the collective whole accumulating as many facts as possible about what can maximize our life satisfaction (both now and in the future), and then heeding those facts to determine what we ought to do above all else to achieve those ends.  This is ultimately an empirical question, and a science of morality can help us discover what these facts are.

Sustainability, Happiness, and a Science of Morality: Part I

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Human beings seem to share the fundamental goal of wanting to live a satisfying and fulfilling life. We all want to be happy, and the humanist movement is an excellent demonstration of the kinds of strategies that have been most effective at achieving this admirable goal – such as the push for democracy, equality, basic human rights, and the elimination of poverty. Clearly we have a long way to go before human happiness is anywhere near universal, let alone maximized – if these are in fact possible futures within our grasp. We’re certainly not going to get there very easily (if at all) unless we address a number of serious societal problems.

One of the most pressing issues facing us today, because of it’s negative impact on just about every other societal problem, is the problem of overpopulation. The reasons for this are obvious and include the decreasing number of available resources per capita, thus forcing people to stretch their resources thinner and thinner over an ever growing population, and/or inclining some societies to go to war with others in order to obtain more resources. Then there’s also the problematic increase in environmental degradation and waste production as the population grows. Beyond the typical resources we’re depleting such as energy/power, food, clean air and water, and raw materials for making various products, there’s also other limited resources that are often overlooked such as the amount of available (let alone habitable) space where people can live, grow food, store waste, etc. There’s also a relatively small percentage of people employed in professions that not only require very special training but that also form the backbone of our society (such as teachers, doctors, scientists, etc.). As these latter resources get stretched thinner and thinner (i.e. education, healthcare, and scientific expertise and research), we’re effectively diluting the backbone of our society which can eventually cascade into societal collapse.

To be sure, there are several ways to combat many of these problems that are caused or exacerbated by overpopulation, for example, by shifting from a goods-based economy to a service-flow economy that recycles product materials that would otherwise be wasted (in part by leasing many of the products that are currently bought and later thrown into a landfill), by increasing the percentage of less-pollutive or non-pollutive renewable energy sources, and finding other ways of decreasing the demand for and increasing the efficiency and distribution of all the resources we rely on. The problem with these approaches however is that although these technologies and admirable efforts are slowly improving, the population is also increasing at the same time. So even if we are in fact increasing efficiency and decreasing consumption and waste per capita, we are simultaneously increasing that very capita, and so it is difficult to tell if technological progress has been (or will eventually be) fast enough to produce a true increase in overall sustainability per capita. It would be fallacious and unjustified to simply assume that to be the case – that technology will always be able to fix every problem. If anything, to error on the side of caution, we should assume that this isn’t the case until we have enough data and knowledge to prove otherwise.

Population Reduction is the Name of the Game

An obvious solution to this problem is to decrease the population growth rate such that our technological capabilities are more than sufficient enough to deliver a sustainable future for us. This goal may even require a negative growth rate, and at some point we’re going to have to start talking about what kinds of societal changes are necessary in order to achieve that goal. We may need some new incentives and/or some other kind of population control measures and policies, however, I’m hopeful that solving this problem is pragmatically achievable if we can manage to seriously educate the populace about how their reproductive choices affect the lives of everyone else in the world and how it is likely to impact future generations (though I don’t think this will be an easy task by any means). If people knew that certain reproductive choices would likely lead to either themselves, their children, or their children’s children, living in a future society filled with unprecedented amounts of poverty and war, environmental and economic collapse, and numerous other sources of suffering – any rational person would heed that knowledge and try their best to combat that possible future.

So a large part of the solution is simply educating everybody about the facts and probabilities of these undesirable outcomes. There are already many individuals and groups of people working on these types of endeavors, trying to push for renewable energy, pro-environmental advocacy and other sustainable living practices and policies, spreading education about family planning and trying to increase the access to and adoption of birth control methods, etc. Unfortunately, these practices haven’t yet been adopted by anywhere near a national nor global majority – far from it. However, if the movement becomes more globalized and builds up to a critical mass and momentum, eventually we’re likely to see the average person’s physical and psychological well being improve, which will further reinforce the incentives to improve and perpetuate the movement, because people will start to realize the tangible benefits they are gaining as a result.

Systematic & Ideological Barriers to Sustainability & Happiness

Unfortunately there are some serious systematic and ideological barriers that are preventing the sustainability movement from gaining traction and they’re ultimately inhibiting what would otherwise be fairly reasonable rates of progress. I think that the primary systematic barrier against achieving sustainability has been corporate-capitalism and the free-market economic models currently in place. While it may be true that there are certain forms of capitalism along with certain regulated market models that could work in principle if not also in practice, unfortunately these aren’t the brands of capitalism and market models that are currently employed by most industrialized nations (though some nations have more sustainable models than others).

What we currently have now are globalized economic systems and models that are fundamentally based on maximizing profit and consolidating privately owned production means at the expense of not only exploiting and depleting our natural resources and environment but also by exploiting unethical sources of human labor. Furthermore, these models have in turn led to unprecedented levels of socioeconomic inequality and environmental degradation. Then again, what else should we expect to happen when we employ corporate-capitalist free-market models which inherently lack adequate and universal economic, labor and environmental regulations? Despite the fact that the wealthy corporate elite, and the many politicians and citizens that have bought into their propaganda, have actually been touting this model as “the best in the world” or “the best model possible”, we can see that this isn’t true at all both by the fallacious fundamental principles that the models are based on and the actual results they’ve been delivering thus far. If we’re going to have a sustainable future, let alone one that provides us more satisfaction and happiness throughout our lives, we’re going to have to jump off of this sinking ship, and adopt an entirely new societal model.

We also need to consider the ideological barriers that have been hindering the sustainability movement as well as the humanism movement in general. For example, there are many prominent religions such as Christianity and Islam (which are highly influential as they make up over half the population of the world) that believe that one of the primary goals for human beings (according to their “divinely inspired” scripture) is to “be fruitful and multiply” while also claiming a general dominion over all the plants and animals of the earth. While the latter “dominion” over the earth has been interpreted by some as “responsible stewardship” (which is compatible with sustainability), it has often been interpreted as “ownership” over the environment and as justification to exploit it strictly for the benefit of human beings (not realizing our intimate dependence on all other ecosystems). Worse yet, the former “be fruitful and multiply” adage can only be reasonably interpreted one way, and unfortunately this “advice” is the antithesis of a sustainable model for society (though it has been an incredibly effective meme for the expansion of these religions and their cultural influence and power). Indeed, it is the exact opposite of what we should be doing at this point in human history, and perhaps the greatest irony here is that the current overpopulation problem was largely a result of this adage, and the subsequent viral spread of these Abrahamic religions over the past fifteen hundred years especially.

Two other religious beliefs worth mentioning here, which have also been highly popularized by the Abrahamic religions (notably Christianity), are the beliefs that “the end is near” and that “no matter what happens, everything is in God’s hands”, as these beliefs and the overall mentality they reinforce do nothing to support the long-term responsible planning that is fundamental to a sustainable societal model. The latter belief plays on an unfortunate human cognitive bias known as risk compensation, where we tend to behave less responsibly when we feel that we are adequately protected from any harm. In the case of a fanatical belief in divine protection, their level of risk compensation is biased to the theoretical maximum, thus making them the most likely to behave the most irresponsibly. The former belief (“the end is near”) unavoidably shifts the believer’s priorities to the short term (and in proportion to the strength of the belief), and with the specific intention of preparing for this “end that is to come”, rather than basing their beliefs on reality and evidence and responsibly preparing for a brighter future for all of humanity and the rest of the planet that we depend on.

Certainly, these religious beliefs aren’t the only ideological barriers to sustainability, as there are a number of other irrational political ideologies that are largely though not exclusively based on the rejection of scientific evidence and consensus, and have served to heavily reinforce the fossil-fuel and other natural resource driven corporate-capitalist model. This unsustainable model has been reinforced by denying facts about climate change and many other facts pertaining to human impacts on the environment in general. In some cases, I find it difficult to tell if the people that make these absurd claims actually believe them to be true (e.g. that 99+% of scientists are somehow conspiring or lying to everybody else in the world), or if they are just implicitly pleading ignorance and rationalizing so that they can maintain their profit-driven models for outright insatiable greed. I find it most plausible that politicians are collaborating with certain corporations to deny scientific facts because they want to continue to make billions off of this resource exploitation (at least for as long as they can get away with it), and are doing so in large part by brainwashing the constituent base that elected them into office with mounds of corporate-funded misinformation, fear mongering, and empty political rhetoric.

It should also come as no surprise that the people that believe and/or perpetuate these political ideological barriers to sustainability are most often the very same people that believe and/or perpetuate the aforementioned religious ideological barriers, and it seems quite evident that politicians have taken advantage of this fact. Many of them surely know quite well that if they can persuade religious voters to vote for them by convincing those voters that they share a common ground on some moral issue, then those voters become distracted from critically thinking about the primary political agendas that those politicians are really pushing for behind the curtain. The very agendas that are in fact hindering a sustainable future from ever coming into fruition.

We’ve all seen it – certain politicians claiming that they oppose stem cell research or abortion, or that advocate for abolishing the separation between church and state (though generally not admittedly), and use this tactic to suck in these (often) single issue religious voters, while ironically promoting a number of policies that often violate the morals of those very same voters (unbeknownst to the voters). They enact policies that perpetuate war, capital punishment, poverty, and the military-industrial complex. They enact policies that worsen socioeconomic inequality and the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. They enact policies that are destroying the finite supply of natural capital we have left on this planet. They enact policies that ultimately hinder democracy, equality, and universal human rights.

So in the end, most religious voters (and some non-religious voters that are similarly misled), while admirably trying to do what they believe is the most moral thing to do, end up vastly increasing the amount of immoral behavior and suffering in the world, due in large part to the politicians that manipulated them into doing so. Which is why it is crucial that people make their decisions based on reason and evidence and also critically think about the consequences of their decisions and actions as they are sometimes more complicated than we are often led to believe. We need to think more critically of all the policies and legislation that we are choosing based on who we vote for, and we also need to be wary of policies that may initially seem to align with our morals and desires, and yet will actually result in more suffering or other unforeseen problems in the long run.

In the next part of this post, I will elaborate more on the broader human goals we all seem to share, and how a science of morality can help us use those broader goals to alleviate these societal problems and simultaneously help us to achieve a future where we are all collectively happier than we ever thought we could be, with far more fulfilling lives.  Here’s the link to part two.

The Properties of God: Much Ado About Nothing

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Having previously written about various Arguments for God’s Existence, including some of the inherent flaws and problems with those arguments, and having analyzed some of the purported attributes of God as most often defined by theists, I decided to reiterate some of the previous points I’ve mentioned and also expand further on the topic. Specifically, I’d like to further analyze the most common definitions and properties of God as claimed by theists.  God is often defined by theists as an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent being that is also uncaused, beginningless, timeless, changeless, spaceless, and immaterial among other attributes.  God is also defined by many as some form of disembodied mind possessing free will.  Since this list of terms is perhaps the most common I’ve seen over the years within theological circles, I’ll simply focus on these terms to analyze within this post.

Omniscience, Omnipotence, Changelessness, and Free Will

The property of omniscience is perhaps the single most significant property within this list because if it is taken to be true, it inevitably leads to the logical impossibility of some of the other attributes in this list.  For instance, if God’s knowledge includes complete knowledge of the future, then God is unable to change that future.  That is, whatever future that God would be aware of must happen exactly as it does, and God would not have the ability to change such a fate (otherwise this God would have failed to know the future without error).  This leads to the logical impossibility of God possessing both omniscience and omnipotence, as God loses the ability to enact any kind of change whatsoever that isn’t already pre-ordained or known by this God in advance.  God would not only know the future of all events occurring within the universe (presumably mediated by the very laws of physics that this God would have created) thus eliminating any possible free will for all of humanity, but this God would also know the future of all his other actions, thoughts, intentions, etc., and thus God wouldn’t be able to have free will either.  One can try to preserve the theological property of omnipotence or free will by denying that of omniscience (by limiting God’s knowledge of the future in some way).  However, even if this God didn’t have the ability to know the future with 100% certainty as implied with omniscience, the absence of omniscience wouldn’t negate the possibility that this God may still have no choice or ability to act any other way (even if this God doesn’t know ahead of time what those actions will be).

Even if we accepted that God doesn’t have omniscience, and if we also ignored the possibility that God may still lack free will or omnipotence even in the absence of that omniscient foreknowledge, one must still explain how a definitively changeless being could ever instantiate any kind of change at all, let alone to create the entire universe, space, and time (which is dependent on change).  Is it even logically possible for a changeless being to instantiate change?  That is, could a being possessing a de facto property such as changelessness simultaneously possess a modal property or capability of change?  Even if it were logically possible, there doesn’t appear to be any way at all for the modal property to ever be self-instantiated by a de facto changeless being.

An outside causal force may be able to instantiate the change in the previously changeless being, but I see no way that this could be accomplished by the changeless being itself.  One may try to resolve this dilemma by positing that one aspect or component of the changeless state of God was the constant or changeless intention to eventually cause a change at some future time x (e.g. to eventually create the universe), but this attempted resolution carries with it the problem of contradicting the supposed theological property of timelessness, since there can’t be some future moment for any change to occur in any kind of timeless scenario.  This would suggest that some kind of temporal delay is occurring until the change is eventually realized, which is logically incoherent in a timeless scenario.  Thus, I see no reason or logical argument to support the claim that a de facto property of changelessness could ever co-exist with a modal property or capability of self-causing any kind of change, and thus a timeless or changeless being would be causally effete thereby negating the property of omnipotence.


One major problem that I see regarding the property of omnibenevolence, is that the term itself isn’t well-defined.  Sure, one can easily grasp the basic concept of being all-loving or all-good, but exactly what standard is one using to define goodness, or love, since these are not objectively defined concepts?  Another way of describing this problem, within the context of Divine Command Theory, is known as Euthyphro’s Dilemma (from one of Plato’s dialogues), where one must ask: Is something good because God says it is good, or does God say something is good because of some other quality it has?  If the standard of goodness comes from God (i.e. “it’s good because God says so”), then it is entirely arbitrary and this would also mean that the definition of omnibenevolence is circular and therefore invalid.  If the standard of goodness comes from some other cause or being, then that means that goodness is dependent on something other than God and this would also undermine the idea that God is uncaused or beginningless, since the property of God’s benevolence (even if omnibenevolent) would have been dependent on something other than God.  Beyond these problems it would also undermine the idea of God being omnipotent since God wouldn’t have the power to self-instantiate this standard of goodness.

Another problem with positing that God is omnibenevolent, is the oft mentioned Problem of Evil, which ultimately refers to the problem of how to reconcile the supposed existence and omnibenevolence of God with all of the suffering that exists in the world.  If God was truly omnibenevolent, then how can one explain the existence of any “evil or suffering at all?  If God doesn’t have the ability to create a universe without any suffering, then this is another argument against God’s omnipotence.  If God does have the ability to do this but doesn’t, then this is an argument against God’s omnibenevolence, assuming that the elimination of all suffering is in accord with the standard of goodness, as one would expect.

Some philosophers have attempted to form various theodicies or defenses to reconcile the Problem of Evil with the idea of an omnipotent and/or omnibenevolent God, but they are ultimately unsuccessful.  For example, some attempts to resolve this problem involve asserting that good simply can’t logically exist without evil, implying that they are relative to and thus dependent on one another, which basically reasserts the old adage “you can’t have the sour without the sweet”.  The problem with this argument is that, if taken further, it would also imply that an omnibenevolent being (as God is often defined as) is also logically dependent on the existence of an equal but opposite omnimalevolent being, or at the very least, that it is dependent on the property of omnimalevolence.  This would mean that if God is indeed omnibenevolent, then this property of God is logically dependent on the existence of omnimalevolence, and this is another argument showing that God is not uncaused or beginningless, because this particular property of God wouldn’t even be a possibility without the existence of something that is definitively not a part of God (by definition).

Beyond all of these problems mentioned thus far, there seem to be at least several possible solutions that God (if omnibenevolent and all-powerful) could employ to eliminate suffering, and if these possibilities exist, the fact that none of them have been implemented argues against God being omnibenevolent.  For example, why couldn’t God simply feed our brains (even if just a brain in a vat) with a sensory input of nothing but pleasurable experiences?  Even if pleasure was dependent on some kind of contrast with less pleasurable experiences in the past (or if we would unavoidably become desensitized to a particular level of pleasure), God could simply amplify the magnitude of pleasurable sensory inputs with each subsequent moment of time indefinitely, thus producing an experience of nothing but constant and equally potent pleasure.

Moreover, if the God that most theists propose truly exists, and some kind of heaven or eternal paradise is within God’s capabilities (filled with a bunch of disembodied minds or souls), then there’s no rational reason why God couldn’t simply create all of us in heaven from the very beginning of our existence.  This is basically the case already with many miscarried or aborted fetuses (if theists assume that fetuses have souls and go to heaven immediately after their death), since many of these fetuses aren’t even alive long enough to have developed a brain with any level of consciousness or ability to experience any suffering at all.  Thus, they would represent a perfect example of individuals that only experience an eternity of pleasure completely void of any kind of suffering.  One would think if this is already a reality for some individuals, God should have the power to make it the case for all people, so nobody has to suffer at all.  This is of course if God couldn’t simply create all humans in heaven from the very beginning and skip the creation of the physical universe altogether.  If God lacks this ability, it is yet another argument against this God being omnipotent.  In addition to this, if it were the case that any conscious being created by God is ever destined to any kind of eternal torture (i.e. some version of “hell”), due to no chance of forgiveness after death, this would be perhaps the strongest argument against this God being omnibenevolent.  So as we can see, if eternal paradise and/or eternal damnation are actually real places created/mediated by God, then their very existence argues against God’s omnibenevolence and/or God’s omnipotence since we’re not all created in heaven from the very beginning of our existence, and/or since there are people destined to suffer for eternity.

Another attempt to resolve this Problem of Evil is the argument that humans wouldn’t be able to have free will without the existence of “evil” or suffering.  However, this makes absolutely no sense for a number of reasons.  For one, as mentioned previously, classical free will (i.e. the ability to have chosen to behave differently, given the same initial conditions, less randomness) is already impossible based on the laws of physics and our level of causal closure, and this is the case whether our physical laws are fundamentally deterministic or random.  So this attempted resolution is a desperate objection at best, because it also requires us to assume that we’re constantly violating the laws of physics and causal closure in order to be causa sui, or self-caused intentional agents.  So we’d have to grant one absurdity in order to explain away another which doesn’t solve the dilemma at all, but rather just replaces one dilemma with another.

Finally, if “heaven” or some form of eternal paradise is still a possible product of God’s power, then the free will argument is irrelevant in any case.  After all, presumably we wouldn’t have free will in heaven either, for if we did have free will to rebel or cause “evil” or suffering in heaven, this would contradict the very idea of what heaven is supposed to be (since it is defined as an eternal and perfect paradise without any “evil” or suffering at all).  If one argues that it is still possible to have free will in a heaven that is guaranteed to be void of evil or suffering, then this simply shows that suffering isn’t necessary in order to have free will, and thus the free will argument to the Problem of Evil still fails.  If we didn’t have free will in heaven (which would seem to be logically necessary in order for heaven to exist as defined), then we can see that infinite or maximal “goodness” or eternal paradise is indeed possible even in the absence of any free will, which would thus negate the free will argument to the Problem of Evil (even if we granted the absurdity that classical free will was possible).  So no matter how you look at it, the property of omnibenevolence appears to be ill-defined or circular and is thus meaningless and/or it is incompatible with some of the other purported theological properties used to define God (i.e. uncaused, beginningless, omnipotent, etc.).


If God was omnipresent, one would think that we would be able to universally and undeniably detect the presence of God, and yet the exact opposite is the case.  In fact, God appears to be completely invisible and entirely undetectable.  In cases where there are theists that claim to have actually experienced or detected the presence of God in some way, it is always in a way that can’t be validated or confirmed by any physical evidence whatsoever.  Science has demonstrated time and time again that when people experience phenomena that do not correlate with reality, i.e., phenomena that do not occur outside of their minds and thus that can’t be independently verified with physical evidence, they are the result of perceptual illusions and other strictly mental phenomena (whether they are full blown hallucinations, delusions, mis-attributed emotional experiences, etc.).  In general though, the basic trend exemplified by theists is that whenever they have an experience that is seemingly unexplainable, they attribute it to being an act of God.

Unfortunately, this is an extremely weak position to take (and increasingly weak as history has amply shown) simply because this “God of the gaps” mentality has been demonstrably proven to be fallacious and unreliable as science has continued to explain more and more previously unexplainable phenomena that were once attributed to one god or another.  So in Bayesian terms, the prior probability that some unexplainable phenomenon is the result of some kind of God is infinitesimally small, and that probability has only decreased over time and will only continue to decrease over time as scientific progress continues to falsify supernatural explanations and attributions by replacing them with natural ones.

So unless we are talking about some kind of Pantheism (where God is basically defined as being equivalent to the universe itself), then we have theists claiming that God is everywhere when this God in fact appears to be nowhere at all.  The simple fact that nobody has been able to demonstrate or verify the existence of God with any physical evidence whatsoever, is a strong argument against the omnipresence of God (if not an argument against the very existence of God).  Ultimately, the theological property of omnipresence is a meaningless term if this type of presence is one that is completely undetectable and unfalsifiable, which would make sense regarding a being that doesn’t possess any properties of space, time, or material, but unfortunately it also means that this term doesn’t adhere to any reasonable convention of what it means to be present, and it also means that the property of omnipresence is incompatible with the properties of being spaceless, timeless, and immaterial.  If the type of omnipresence is that which is claimed to be experienced by theists from time to time, experiences that have been shown to be strictly mental with no correlation to the external world, then this is actually nothing more than a limited type of presence (and one that is strictly mental), and one likely resulting from mis-attributed emotions combined with various inherent human cognitive biases.

Abstract Objects, Disembodied Minds & God

Perhaps the most interesting thing I’ve discovered regarding these theological properties pertains to the subset of properties that specifically describe God to be uncaused, beginningless, timeless, changeless, spaceless, and immaterial (which I’ll now abbreviate as simply UBTCSI).  These terms have also been formulated by theists in various arguments for the existence of God (such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument), with theists trying to argue that the origin of the universe must have been brought about by a cause having this particular set of properties.  What I find most interesting is that contemporary philosophers of ontology have ascribed this set of terms to certain abstract objects such as numbers and properties.  It is also notable that these properties seem to result by way of negation, that is, by removing all (or nearly all) aspects of our perceived reality.

The fact that these terms are used to describe the properties of abstract objects in general, which are almost universally agreed to be causally effete, actually supports the idea that God is nothing more than an abstract object.  Even if abstract objects have some kind of ontological existence independent of the brains that most likely produce them, they have still been shown to be causally effete.  If abstract objects do not have any kind of ontological existence independent of the brains that most likely produce them, then they are actually the product of brains which possess the converse of the UBTCSI properties, that is, they are the product of brains which possess the properties of being caused and thus having a beginning, as well as the properties of time, change, space, and material.

If abstract objects are nothing more than constructs of the brain, then we may expect that the minds that produce these abstract objects would have similar properties ascribed to them as well.  Sure enough, many philosophers have indeed also used the aforementioned UBTCSI properties to describe a mind.  So, if it is true that abstract objects as well as the minds they appear to be dependent on are ultimately products of the physical brain (with the latter being well-nigh proven at this point), then ultimately they are both produced from that which possesses the naturalistic properties of causality, beginning, time, change, space, material, etc., thus arguably challenging the claim that either abstracta or minds can be defined properly with the UBTCSI properties.

Many theists have taken advantage of the aforementioned “ontology of mind” and posited that God is some kind of disembodied mind, thus presumably adhering to these same UBTCSI properties, yet with the addition of several more properties that were mentioned earlier (i.e. omnipotence, omniscience, etc.).  However, one major problem with this tactic is that the term, disembodied mind, is simply an ad hoc conceptualization, and one that doesn’t make much if any sense at all when thought about more critically.  After all, if the only minds that we’re aware of are those demonstrably produced from the underlying machinery of physical brains, then what exactly would a disembodied mind entail anyway?  What would it be composed of if not physical materials (and thus those which lie in space)?  How would it function at all if the only minds we know of involve an underlying machinery of constantly changing neuronal configurations which subsequently cause the mental experience that we call a mind?  How can this mind think at all, when thinking is itself a temporal process, known to speed up or slow down depending on various physical variables (e.g. neurotransmitter concentrations, temperature, Relativistic effects, etc.)?

These questions illustrate the fact that the only concept of a mind that makes any sense at all is that which involves the properties of causality, time, change, space, and material, because minds result from particular physical processes involving a very complex configuration of physical materials.  That is, minds appear to be necessarily complex in terms of their physical structure (i.e. brains), and so trying to conceive of a mind that doesn’t have any physical parts at all, let alone a complex arrangement of said parts, is simply absurd (let alone a mind that can function without time, change, space, etc.).  At best, we are left with an ad hoc, unintelligible combination of properties without any underlying machinery or mechanism.

So the fact that there exist strong arguments and evidence in support of abstract objects being nothing more than products of the mind, and the fact that minds in general are demonstrably the product of physical brains and their underlying complex neuronal configurations, illustrates that the only things in our universe that philosophers have ascribed these UBTCSI properties to (minds and abstract objects) are in fact more accurately described by the converse of those very properties.  It would then logically follow that God, claimed to possess the very same properties, is most likely to be nothing more than a causally effete abstract object — a mere mentally simulated model produced by our physical brains.  This entails that the remaining properties of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence, which are themselves abstract objects, are ultimately ascribed to yet another causally effete abstract object.

Much Ado About Nothing

As we can see, the properties commonly ascribed to God suggest that this God as described is:

1) Ill-defined since some of the properties are ultimately meaningless or circular, and

2) Logically impossible since some of the properties contradict one another, and

3) Likely to be a causally effete construct of the mind.

So overall, the theist’s strenuous endeavors in arguing over what the properties of their purported God must be, has ultimately been much ado about nothing at all.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence

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Previously, I’ve written briefly about some of the cosmological arguments for God.  I’d like to expand on this topic, and I’ll begin doing so in this post by analyzing the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), since it is arguably the most well known version of the argument, which can be described with the following syllogism:

(1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause;

(2) The universe began to exist;


(3) The universe has a cause.

The conclusion of this argument is often expanded by theists to suggest that the cause must be supernaturally transcendent, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and perhaps most importantly, this cause must itself be uncaused, in order to avoid the causal infinite regress implied by the KCA’s first premise.

Unfortunately this argument fails for a number of reasons.  The first thing that needs to be clarified is the definitions of terms used in these premises.  What is meant by “everything”, or “begins to exist”?  “Everything” in this context does imply that there are more than one of these things, which means that we are referring to a set of things, indeed the set of all things in this case.  The set of all things implied here apparently refers to all matter and energy in the universe, specifically the configuration of any subset of all matter and/or energy.  Then we have the second element in the first premise, “begins to exist”, which would thus refer to when the configuration of some set of matter and/or energy changes to a new configuration.  So we could rewrite the first premise as “any configuration of matter and/or energy that exists at time T and which didn’t exist at the time immediately prior to time T (which we could call T’), was a result of some cause”.  If we want to specify how “immediately prior” T’ is to T, we could use the smallest unit of time that carries any meaning per the laws of physics which would be the Planck time (roughly 10^-43 seconds), which is the time it takes the fastest entity in the universe (light) to traverse the shortest distance in the universe (the Planck length).

Does Everything Have a Cause?

Now that we’ve more clearly defined what is meant by the first premise, we can address whether or not that premise is sound.  It seems perfectly reasonable based on the nature of causality that we currently understand that there is indeed some cause that drives the changes in the configurations of sets of matter and energy that we observe in the universe, most especially in the everyday world that we observe.  On a most fundamental physical level, we would typically say that the cause of these configuration changes is described as the laws of physics.  Particles and waves all behave as they do, very predictably changing from one form into another based on these physical laws or consistent patterns that we’ve discovered.  However, depending on the interpretation of quantum mechanics used, there may be acausal quantum processes happening, for example, as virtual particle/anti-particle pairs pop into existence without any apparent deterministic path.  That is, unless there are non-local hidden variables that we are unaware of which guide/cause these events, there don’t appear to be any deterministic or causal driving forces behind certain quantum phenomena.  At best, the science is inconclusive as to whether all phenomena have causes, and thus one can’t claim certainty to the first premise of the KCA.  Unless we find a way to determine that quantum mechanics is entirely deterministic, we simply don’t know that matter and energy are fundamentally causally connected as are objects that we observe at much larger scales.

The bottom line here is that quantum indeterminism carries with it the possibility of acausality until proven otherwise, thus undermining premise one of the KCA with the empirical evidence found within the field of quantum physics.  As such, it is entirely plausible that if the apparent quantum acausal processes are fundamental to our physical world, the universe itself may have arisen from said acausal processes, thus undermining premise two as well as the conclusion of the KCA.  We can’t conclude that this is the case, but it is entirely possible and is in fact plausible given the peculiar quantum phenomena we’ve observed thus far.

As for the second premise, if we apply our clarified definition of “began to exist” introduced in the first premise to the second, then “the universe began to exist” would mean more specifically that “there was once a time (T’) when the universe didn’t exist and then at time T, the universe did exist.”  This is the most obviously problematic premise, at least according to the evidence we’ve found within cosmology.  The Big Bang Theory as most people are familiar with, which is the prevailing cosmological model for the earliest known moment of the universe, implies that spacetime itself had it’s earliest moment roughly 13.8 billion years ago, and continued to expand and transform over 13.8 billion years until reaching the state that we see it in today.  Many theists try to use this as evidence for the universe being created by God.  However, since time itself was non-existent prior to the Big Bang, it is not sensible to speak of any creation event happening prior to this moment, since there was no time for such an event to happen within.  This presents a big problem for the second premise in the KCA, because in order for the universe to “begin to exist”, it is implied that there was a time prior in which it didn’t exist, and this goes against the Big Bang model in which time never existed prior to that point.

Is Simultaneous Causation Tenable?

One way that theologians and some philosophers have attempted to circumvent this problem is to invoke the concept of simultaneous causation, that is, that (at least some) causes and effects can happen simultaneously.  Thus, if the cause of the universe happened at the same time as the effect (the Big Bang), then the cause of the universe (possibly “creation”) did happen in time, and thus the problem is said to be circumvented.

The concept of simultaneous causation has been proposed for some time by philosophers, most notably Immanuel Kant and others since.  However, there are a few problems with simultaneous causation that I’ll point out briefly.  For one, there don’t appear to be any actual examples in our universe of simultaneous causation occurring.  Kant did propose what he believed to be a couple examples of simultaneous causation to support the idea.  One example he gave was a scenario where the effect of a heated room supposedly occurs simultaneously with a fire in a fireplace that caused it.  Unfortunately, this example fails, because it actually takes time for thermal energy to make its way from the fire in the fireplace to any air molecules in the room (even those that are closest to the fire).  As combustion is occurring and oxygen is combining with hydrocarbon fuels in the wood to produce carbon dioxide and a lot of heat, that heat takes time to propagate.  As the carbon dioxide is being formed, and the molecule is assuming an energetically favorable state, there is still a lag between this event and any heat given off to nearby molecules in the room.  In fact, no physical processes can occur faster than the speed of light by the principles of Relativity, so this refutes any other example analogous to this one.  The fastest way a fire can propagate heat is through radiation (as opposed to conduction or convection), and we know that the propagation of radiation is limited by the speed of light.  Even pulling a solid object causes it to stretch (at least temporarily) so the end of the object farthest away from where it is being pulled will actually remain at rest for a short time while the other end of the object is first pulled in a particular direction.  It isn’t until a short time lag, that the rest of the object “catches up” with the end being pulled, so even with mechanical processes involving solid materials, we never see instantaneous speeds of causal interactions.

Another example Kant gave was one in which a lead ball lies on a cushion and simultaneously causes the effect of an indentation or “hollow” in the cushion.  Again, in order for the ball to cause a dent in the cushion in the first place it had to be moved into the cushion which took some finite amount of time.  Likewise with the previous example, Relativity prevents any simultaneous causation of this sort.  We can see this by noting that at the molecular level, as the electron orbitals from the lead ball approach those of the cushion, the change in the strength of the electric field between the electron orbitals of the two objects can’t travel faster than the speed of light, and thus as the ball moves toward the cushion and eventually “touches” it, the increased strength of the repulsion takes some amount of time to be realized.

One last example I’ve seen given by defenders of simultaneous causation is that of a man sitting down, thus forming a lap.  That is, as the man sits down, and his knees bend, a lap is created in the process, and we’re told that the man sitting down is the cause and the formation of the lap is the simultaneous effect.  Unfortunately, this example also fails because the man sitting down and the lap being formed are really nothing more than two different descriptions of the same event.  One could say that the man formed a lap, or one could say that the man sat down.  Clearly the intentions behind the man were most likely to sit down rather than to form a lap, but nevertheless forming a lap was incidental in the process of sitting down.  Both are describing different aspects of the same event, and thus there aren’t two distinct causal relatum in this example.  In the previous examples mentioned (the fire and heated room or ball denting a cushion), if there are states described that occur simultaneously even after taking Relativity into account, they can likewise be shown to be merely two different aspects or descriptions of the same event.  Even if we could grant that simultaneous causation were possible (which so far, we haven’t seen any defensible examples in the real world), how can we assign causal priority to determine which was the cause and which was the effect?  In terms of the KCA, one could ask, if the cause (C) of the universe occurred at the same time as the effect (E) or existence of the universe, how could one determine if C caused E rather than the other way around?  One has to employ circular argumentation in order to do so, by invoking other metaphysical assumptions in the terms that are being defined which simply begs the question.

Set Theory & Causal Relations

Another problem with the second premise of the KCA is that even if we ignore the cosmological models that refute it, and even ignore the problematic concept of simultaneous causation altogether, there is an implicit assumption that the causal properties of the “things” in the universe also apply to the universe as a whole.  This is fallacious because one can’t assume that the properties of members of a set or system necessarily apply to the system or entire set as a whole.  Much work has been done within set theory to show that this is the case, and thus while some properties of the members or subsets of a system can apply to the whole system, not all properties necessarily do (in fact some properties applying to both members of a set and to the set as a whole can lead to logical contradictions or paradoxes).  One of the properties that is being misapplied here involves the concept of “things” in general.  If we try to consider the universe as a “thing” we can see how this is problematic by noting that we seem to define and conceptualize “things” with causal properties as entities or objects that are located in time and space (that’s an ontology that I think is pretty basic and universal).  However, the universe as a whole is the entirety of space and time (i.e. spacetime), and thus the universe as a whole contains all space and time, and thus can’t itself (as a whole) be located in space or time.

Since the universe appears to be composed of all the things we know about, one might say that the universe is located within “nothing” at all, if that’s at all intelligible to think of.  Either way, the universe as a whole doesn’t appear to be located in time or space, and thus it isn’t located anywhere at all.  Thus, it technically isn’t a “thing” at all, or at the very least, it is not a thing that has any causal properties of its own, since it isn’t located in time or space in order to have causal relations with other things.  Even if one insists on calling it a thing, despite the problems listed here, we are still left with the problem that we can’t assume that causal principles found within the universe apply to the universe as a whole.  So for a number of reasons, premise two of the KCA fails.  Since both premises fail for a number of reasons, the conclusion no longer follows.  So even if the universe does in fact have a cause, in some way unknown to us, the KCA doesn’t successfully support such a claim with its premises.

Is the Kalam Circular?

Yet another problem that Dan Barker and others have pointed out involves the language used in the first premise of the KCA.  The clause, “everything that begins to exist”, implies that reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE) and items that do not begin to exist (NBE).  In order for the KCA to work in arguing for God’s existence, the NBE set can’t be empty.  Even more importantly, it must accommodate more than one item to avoid simply being a synonym for God, for if God is the only object or item within NBE, then the premise “everything that begins to exist has a cause” is equivalent to “everything except God has a cause”.  This simply puts God into the definition of the premise of the argument that is supposed to be used to prove God’s existence, and thus would simply beg the question.  It should be noted that just because the NBE set must accommodate more than one possible item, this doesn’t entail that the NBE set must contain more than one item.  This specific problem with the KCA could be resolved if one could first show that there are multiple possible NBE candidates, followed by showing that of the multiple possible candidates within NBE, only one candidate is valid, and finally by showing that this candidate is in fact some personal creator, i.e., God.  If it can’t be shown that NBE can accommodate more than one item, then the argument is circular.  Moreover, if the only candidate for NBE is God, then the second premise “The universe began to exist” simply reduces to “The universe is not God”, which simply assumes what the argument is trying to prove.  Thus if the NBE set is simply synonymous with God, then the Kalam can be reduced to:

(1) Everything except God has a cause;

(2) The universe is not God;


(3) The universe has a cause.

As we can see, this syllogism is perfectly logical (though the conclusion only follows if the premises are true which is open to debate), but this syllogism is entirely useless as an argument for God’s existence.  Furthermore, regarding the NBE set, one must ask, where do theists obtain the idea that this NBE set exists?  That is, by what observations and/or arguments is the possibility of beginningless objects justified?  We don’t find any such observations in science, although it is certainly possible that the universe itself never began (we just don’t have observations to support this, at least, not at this time) and the concept of a “beginningless universe” is in fact entirely consistent with many eternal cosmological models that have been proposed, in which case the KCA would still be invalidated by refuting premise two in yet another way.  Other than the universe itself potentially being an NBE (which is plausible, though not empirically demonstrated as of yet), there don’t appear to be any other possible NBEs, and there don’t appear to be any observations and/or arguments to justify proposing that any NBEs exist at all (other than perhaps the universe itself, which would be consistent with the law of conservation of mass and energy and/or the Quantum Eternity Theorem).

The KCA Fails

As we can see, the Kalam Cosmological Argument fails for a number of reasons, and thus is unsuccessful in arguing for the existence of God.  Thus, even though it may very well be the case that some god exists and did in fact create the universe, the KCA fails to support such a claim.

Here’s an excellent debate between the cosmologist Sean Carroll and the Christian apologist William Lane Craig which illustrates some of the problems with the KCA, specifically in terms of evidence found within cosmology (or lack thereof).  It goes without saying that Carroll won the debate by far, though he could certainly have raised more points in his rebuttals than he did.  Nevertheless, it was entertaining and a nice civil debate with good points presented on both sides.  Here’s another link to Carroll’s post debate reflections on his blog.

Religious Beliefs & Their Behavioral Consequences

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President Obama made a speech about ISIS (referring to them as ISIL) in response to the horrific murder of journalist James Foley by a British Jihadist back in September (2014):

“ISIL speaks for no religion… and no faith teaches people to massacre innocents. No just God would stand for what they did yesterday and what they do every single day. ISIL has no ideology of any value to human beings. Their ideology is bankrupt…. we will do everything that we can to protect our people and the timeless values that we stand for. May God bless and keep Jim’s memory. And may God bless the United States of America…Now let’s make two things clear: ISIL is not Islamic. No religion condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL’s victims have been Muslim…. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way…. May God bless our troops, and may God bless the United States of America. “

Really?  No religion teaches people to massacre innocents?  Perhaps president Obama is right here, if he’s willing to concede to the idea that “innocence” is entirely subjective and in the eye of the religious believer, which I doubt he would concede.  And really?  He thinks (or merely says) that “no just God would stand for what they did yesterday?”  Either Obama is unintentionally making the case that the God of so many believers is in fact unjust, or that the God of these believers simply doesn’t exist.  For I find it incredibly hard to believe that president Obama isn’t familiar with three of the most violent religions in human history: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  The Old Testament of the Christian’s bible, which is also the strictly Jewish contribution to that book, and the Islamic Qu’ran and various Hadiths (i.e. purported prophetic traditions of Mohammed) are riddled with violence and violent commandments including those urging the believer to kill the infidel, that is, the unbeliever (a group that should be included in the innocents that Obama refers to in his speech), and to kill apostates for leaving the faith.  Islam in particular also highly emphasizes the glory of martyrdom with a 72 virgin reward in paradise for believers that have died (only for men though, women get simply one man that will satisfy them), and this of course can fuel other behavior (terrorism and otherwise) that often kills “infidels” and “apostates” in the process of that sought after martyrdom.  The hostility toward unbelievers and apostates within much of Islamic tradition also explains fairly well why most of ISIS’s victims have been Muslims — simply because there are several Islamic sects living near one another and one sect of Islam doesn’t recognize the other sect(s) as being legitimate followers of Islam (thus they are either seen as infidels, or apostates if they converted from one sect to another).

If we look at the common root of all three of these religions, starting with Abraham, we hear the story of a man that is willing to slice the throat of his own child in the name of religious faith.  We find many instances of mass genocide, rape, enslavement, violence, and many other morally reprehensible acts that were condoned or ordained by the God of these faiths.  We find that adulterers and people that decided to work on the Sabbath were stoned to death.  We find cannibalistic threats of punishment for disobedience.  We find homosexuals getting annihilated.  We find a God that inflicts upon all Egyptians ten plagues including the death of all their first born children.  We even find a God that kills just about every land animal and human being on the entire planet by drowning them (except for Noah, his family, and a couple of each land animal as the story goes).  Needless to say, we find countless atrocities of killing innocents by the hand of God or instigated or commanded by this God through his chosen people in these religion’s scriptural texts.  Were those that died considered innocent in the eyes of their God and thus in the eyes of those believers?  Of course not.  Thus, in this sense and this sense only, president Obama was correct to say that “No religion condones the killing of innocents”.  Unfortunately, this just illustrates that what Obama said was utterly meaningless.

Is the president really being serious here?  Could he really be that unfamiliar with all of this basic scriptural and religious background knowledge to make a ridiculous claim like that?  Could he really be that unfamiliar with the countless lives lost over the years in the name of religion, including the Crusades, the Holocaust, or the many conquests of Islam, including the most brutal that took place throughout India (from the 12th to 16th century CE)?  Could he have missed the fact that the U.S. civil war itself was not only a result of the south fighting for state’s rights, but that it was also largely a result of many Christian southerners defending their “rights” to own slaves based on their straightforward interpretation of biblical scripture?  Surely these travesties had multiple causes behind them including geo-political, economic, and other social factors, but to deny the role of religion and specific religious beliefs in motivating much of that behavior would be simply absurd.  Then again, perhaps the president is merely in denial, asserting the delusional view that many people wish was the case, that is, the idea that all religions are equally peaceful, and that violence just comes from other non-religious sources of bad ideas.  However, how could he possibly square this delusion with the particularly liberal recognition that people are products of their environment, and thus, one’s behavior is affected by every environmental influence?  What exactly will have to happen before everyone is willing to accept the fact that all ideas (including religious ideas) lead to behavioral consequences?  In fact, religious ideas (when taken seriously) are probably one of the most powerful, if not the most powerful motivations for a person’s behaviors.  What seems to be most implicit in Obama’s delusional oration is the fear of criticizing religious ideas in particular.

Why are so many people so afraid of or uncomfortable with discussing and criticizing religion or religious beliefs?  In any other domain of our lives, rational inquiry and discourse are required and happily utilized to continue to progress intellectually as individuals and as an increasingly globalized society.  Every day of our lives we demand evidence and/or persuasive reasons for believing what we’re told by others including how to behave (with more extraordinary claims requiring more extraordinary levels of evidence and reasoning).  We discuss and debate issues openly and without disdain largely to find clarity in each others viewpoints, and to determine whether or not, in light of those arguments and evidence, we should change any of those viewpoints (and the behaviors they promote) for the good of our own lives and the lives of others.  It is primarily when the topic shifts to religion, and the various religious beliefs contained within, do many people start to cower away from an open discourse as well as a critical and rational analysis, thus abandoning their everyday moral values and whatever honesty and integrity they may have otherwise.  As a result, religion has now become one of the only (if not the only) existing domains where irrational, illogical, and often downright dangerous ideas can remain out of the reach of public scrutiny and criticism.  This is especially unfortunate since, as I mentioned earlier, religious beliefs in particular are some of the most powerful influences on people’s behavior that exists.  Thus, it is perhaps one of the most important domains to be criticized.

So why are religion and religious ideas so often seen as exempt from criticism?  I think this has likely been largely fueled by the fact that ideas such as cultural and moral relativism and the tolerance of cultural diversity have been used by many in order to condone or equally respect any belief whatsoever, which is obviously ridiculous.  There are certainly some beneficial concepts contained within the cultural or moral relativistic schools of thought, including the idea that there are different ways of looking at the world and living one’s life, that there isn’t only one absolute way that is “correct” or “right”, that there are different ethical frameworks that prioritize different moral goals, and that it is important to examine beliefs and customs both as an outsider and within the cultural context that they are found and implemented.  However, the fact that we shouldn’t try to see the world through some limited, absolutist lens does not imply that all ideas and beliefs are of equal merit, nor that they will all produce the same consequences.  To think that a cultural context can ever save a belief system from any criticism whatsoever or from the behavioral consequences that they produce is simply ludicrous, especially if we are to adopt them with a specific moral or societal goal in mind, such as the goal of increasing our physical and psychological well being.  In order to increase our well being (and for the long term), our ideas must be rooted in reality and must correspond to the world around us, even if that perspective changes over time in light of new scientific discoveries and philosophical discourse.  This allows us to properly examine ideas and beliefs in terms of the consequences they have on our behavior and how that behavior relates to our ultimate goals.  Thus, religious ideology can’t be an exception to this rule or methodology, nor can any other ideology for that matter.  All ideas and beliefs have an effect on our behavior and the sooner people accept that, the sooner we can start accurately assessing the real dangers that we face and discuss how to deal with some of these dangerous ideas, and the people that believe and promote them.  Furthermore, we can then work to abolish those beliefs that are dangerous, and continue to move forward and substantially improve the quality of everyone’s lives in the process.

It certainly hasn’t helped that many liberals have been exacerbating this problem by unjustifiably labeling critics of various religious beliefs as intolerant bigots or racists.  There have been many instances of this defamatory labeling, most recently against some prominent liberals and atheists that have criticized the dangers of Islam and its inherently violent ideologies, and this labeling has been entirely unwarranted, since these critics haven’t been criticizing any particular race of people nor any inert forms of cultural diversity, but rather are criticizing quite obviously bad and dangerous ideas that are prevalent within a particular religious ideology.  These religious beliefs that are being criticized are those that have only served to inhibit the well being of humanity, by inhibiting many important humanistic principles including the push for equality for all races, all sexual orientations, equal rights for women (including women’s reproductive rights), and also the push for democracy, free thought and rational skepticism.

The irony is that liberals have had a long history of advocating many of these noble principles, and the liberals that are being critical of the critics advocating those principles (by those critics pointing out the religious beliefs that conflict with said principles) are basically abandoning their own values — likely because they’re simultaneously employing an irrational interpretation of cultural relativism.  Admittedly, this irrational interpretation or implementation of cultural relativism certainly has many admirable intentions behind it (such as increasing the tolerance for cultural diversity), but promoting a tolerance for diversity can be (and has already been in many cases) accomplished without abandoning the very universal criticism that has been necessary for the humanistic progress we’ve made thus far.  In the case of president Obama and what I heard in his speech, I realize that most of his motivations are political, as he doesn’t want to alienate the large number of religious voters or his approval ratings, and he probably doesn’t want to upset the large number of Muslims that aren’t a direct threat to our safety (not a threat at this time anyway).  It is also likely that his speech reflects his own mistaken beliefs regarding cultural relativism that have been propagating around many liberal circles (unfortunately).

It’s time for everyone to embrace a world where we can speak openly and honestly about any topic, so we can solve many more of the problems we face, rather than simply remain in denial, potentially putting ourselves and many innocent lives in danger.  Not all people have belief systems that are amenable to reason (in fact most religious belief systems aren’t amenable to reason), and so one must face the harsh reality that in some cases the only option is to detain people with certain dangerous beliefs such that they no longer pose a threat to everyone else in society (just as we currently do with violent criminals).  If they can’t be reasoned with nor detained for the protection of the populace, then they may have to be eliminated through other militaristic means.  Personally, I consider myself to be a pacifist, a humanist, and a progressive in many ways.  However, I’m also pragmatic and realistic, and understand that if there are people that can’t be reasoned out of a dangerous ideology, and that are willing to kill everyone around them that stands in their way — those people need to be stopped in one way or another, if everyone else expects to live happily, let alone survive.  I’d always opt for the most peaceful and diplomatic solutions whenever possible, but once those options have been exhausted, then it becomes a matter of humanists fighting for happiness, cooperation, and well being, versus those that couldn’t care less about human happiness, cooperation, or well being.  In that case, I think humanists need to do what is necessary to survive.  For if they fail to survive, then the violent, totalitarian, theocratic ideology will eventually monopolize the ideology of whichever human beings remain.

On the bright side, I’m also hopeful that even if religions don’t disappear altogether, though I think they will eventually based on the current trends of increasing numbers of agnostics and atheists, many dangerous religious ideologies can continue to be reformed as they have been in the past so that violence and aggression in the name of faith can be reduced.  To be sure, reformation of religion can only go so far if one is to continue to take the scriptural texts (especially as a whole) seriously.  In cases where the message coming from religious scriptures is quite clearly dangerous, then the inability to “reinterpret” one’s way out of the moral predicament leaves only two options:  1) change the text, or 2) no longer abide by all the text.  Unfortunately most religious believers have a fundamental ideological barrier that forbids them from changing the text (if only these texts could be amended over time like the U.S. Constitution has been).  That leaves the second option.  In fact, religious “moderates”, including those in the Abrahamic religions have done just that, by ignoring at least some of the commandments and teachings that are heinous.  It’s a good start either way, but it has taken centuries to accomplish with a lot of blood spilled to get there.  In any case, we can’t make these kinds of positive changes very effectively (if at all) until everyone is willing to start talking about them critically.  Let’s do so.