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“The Brothers Karamazov” – A Moral & Philosophical Critique (Part III)

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In the first two posts that I wrote in this series (part I and part II) concerning some concepts and themes mentioned in Dostoyevksy’s The Brothers Karamazov, I talked about moral realism and how it pertains to theism and atheism (and the character Ivan’s own views), and I also talked about moral responsibility and free will to some degree (and how this related to the interplay between Ivan and Smerdyakov).  In this post, I’m going to look at the concept of moral conscience and intuition, and how they apply to Ivan’s perspective and his experiencing an ongoing hallucination of a demonic apparition.  This demonic apparition only begins to haunt Ivan after hearing that his influence on his brother Smerdyakov led him to murder their father Fyodor.  The demon continues to torment Ivan until just before his other brother Alyosha informs him that Smerdyakov has committed suicide.  Then I’ll conclude with some discussion on the concept of moral desert (justice).

It seems pretty clear that the demonic apparition that appears to Ivan is a psychosomatic hallucination brought about as a manifestation of Ivan’s overwhelming guilt for what his brother has done, since he feels that he bears at least some of the responsibility for his brothers actions.  We learn earlier in the story that Zosima, a wise elder living at a monastery who acts as a mentor and teacher to Alyosha, had explained to Ivan that everyone bears at least some responsibility for the actions of everyone around them because human causality is so heavily intertwined with one person’s actions having a number of complicated effects on the actions of everyone else.  Despite Ivan’s strong initial reservations against this line of reasoning, he seems to have finally accepted that Zosima was right — hence him suffering a nervous breakdown as a result of realizing this.

Obviously Ivan’s moral conscience seems to be driving this turn of events and this is the case whether or not Ivan explicitly believes that morality is real.  And so we can see that despite Ivan’s moral skepticism, his moral intuitions and/or his newly accepted moral dispositions as per Zosima, have led him to his current state of despair.  Similarly, Ivan’s views on the problem of evil — whereby the vast amount of suffering in the world either refutes the existence of God, or shows that this God (if he does exist) must be a moral monster — betray even more of Ivan’s moral views with respect to how he wants the world to be.  His wanting the world to have less suffering in it, along with his wishing that his brother had not committed murder (let alone as a result of his influence on his brother), illustrates a number of moral “oughts” that Ivan subscribes to.  And whether they’re simply based on his moral intuitions or also rational moral reflection, they illustrate the deeply rooted psychological aspects of morality that are an inescapable facet of the human condition.

This situation also helps to explain some of the underlying motivations behind my own reversion back toward some form of moral realism, after becoming an atheist myself, initially catalyzed by my own moral intuitions and then later solidified and justified by rational moral reflection on objective facts pertaining to human psychology and other factors.  Now it should be said that moral intuitions on their own are only a generally useful heuristic as they are often misguiding (and incorrect) which is why it is imperative that they are checked by a rational assessment of the facts at hand.  But, nevertheless, they help to illustrate how good and evil can be said to be real (in at least some sense), even to someone like Ivan that doesn’t think they have an objective foundation.  They may not be conceptions of good and evil as described in many religions, with supernatural baggage attached, but they are real nonetheless.

Another interesting point worth noting is in regard to Zosima’s discussion about mutual moral responsibility.  While I already discussed moral responsibility in the last post along with its relation to free will, there’s something rather paradoxical about Dostoyevsky’s reasoning as expressed through Zosima that I found quite interesting.  Zosima talks about how love and forgiveness are necessary because everyone’s actions are intertwined with everyone else’s and therefore everyone bears some responsibility for the sins of others.  This idea of shared responsibility is abhorrent to those in the story that doubt God and the Christian religion (such as Ivan), who only want to be responsible for their own actions, but the complex intertwined causal chain that Zosima speaks of is the same causal chain that many determinists invoke to explain our lack of libertarian free will and how we can’t be held responsible in a causa sui manner for our actions.

Thus, if someone dies and there is in fact an afterlife, by Zosima’s own reasoning that person should not be judged as an individual solely responsible for their actions either.  That person should instead receive unconditional love and forgiveness and be redeemed rather than punished.  But this idea is anathema to standard Christian theology where one is supposed to be judged and given eternal paradise or eternal torment (with vastly disproportionate consequences given the finite degree of one’s actions).  It’s no surprise that Zosima isn’t looked upon as a model clergyman by some of his fellow monks in the monastery because his emphatic preaching about love and forgiveness undermines the typical heavy-handed judgemental aspects of God within Christianity.  But in any case, if God exists and understood that people were products of their genes and their environment which is causally interconnected with everyone else’s (i.e. libertarian free will is logically impossible), then a loving God would grant everyone forgiveness after death and grant them eternal paradise based on that understanding.  And oddly enough, this also undermines Ivan’s own reasoning that good and evil can only exist with an afterlife that undergoes judgement, because forgiveness and eternal paradise should be granted to everyone in the afterlife (by a truly loving God) if Zosima’s reasoning was taken to it’s logical conclusions.  So not only does Zosima’s reasoning seem to undermine the justification for unequal treatment of souls in the afterlife, but it also undermines the Christian conception of free will to boot (which is logically impossible regardless of Zosima’s reasoning).

And this brings me to the concept of moral desert.  In some ways I agree with Zosima, at least in the sense that love (or more specifically compassion) and forgiveness are extremely important in proper moral reasoning. And once one realizes the logical impossibility of libertarian free will, this should only encourage one’s use of love and forgiveness in the sense that people should never be trying to punish a wrongdoer (or hope for their punishment) for the sake of retributive justice or vengeance.  Rather, people should only punish (or hope that one is punished) as much as is necessary to compensate the victim as best as the circumstances allow and (more importantly) to rehabilitate the wrongdoer by reprogramming them through behavioral conditioning.  Anything above and beyond this is excessive, malicious, and immoral.  Similarly, a loving God (if one existed) would never punish anyone in the afterlife beyond what is needed to rehabilitate them (and it would seem that no punishment at all should really be needed if this God had the power to accomplish these feats on immaterial souls using magic), and if this God had no magic to accomplish this, then at the very least, it would still mean that there should never by any eternal punishments, since punishing someone forever (let alone torturing them forever), not only illustrates that there is no goal to rehabilitate the wrongdoer, but also that this God is beyond psychopathic and malevolent.  Again, think of Zosima’s reasoning as it applies here.

Looking back at the story with Smerdyakov, why does the demonic apparition disappear from Ivan right around the time that he learns that Smerdyakov killed himself?  It could be because Ivan thinks that Smerdyakov has gotten what he deserved, and that he’s no longer roaming free (so to speak) after his heinous act of murder.  And it could also be because Ivan seemed sure at that point that he would confess to the murder (or at least motivating Smerdyakov to do it).  But if either of these notions are true, then once again Ivan has betrayed yet another moral disposition of his, that murder is morally wrong.  It may also imply that Ivan, deep down, may in fact believe in an afterlife, and that Smerdyakov will now be judged for his actions.

It no doubt feels good to a lot of people when they see someone that has wronged another, getting punished for their bad deeds.  The feeling of justice and even vengeance can be so emotionally powerful, especially if the wrongdoer took the life of someone that you or someone else loved very much.  It’s a common feeling to want that criminal to suffer, perhaps to rot in jail until they die, perhaps to be tortured, or what-have-you.  And these intuitions illustrate why so many religious beliefs surrounding judgment in the afterlife share many of these common elements.  People invented these religious beliefs (whether unconsciously or not) because it makes them feel better about wrongdoers that may otherwise die without having been judged for their actions.  After all, when is justice going to be served?  It is also a motivating factor for a lot of people to keep their behaviors in check (as per Ivan’s rationale regarding an afterlife requirement in order for good and evil to be meaningful to people).  Even though I don’t think that this particular motivation is necessary (and therefore Ivan’s argument is incorrect) — due to other motivating forces such as the level of fulfillment and personal self-worth in one’s life, gained through living a life of moral virtue, or the lack thereof by those that fail to live virtuously — it is still a motivation that exists with many people and strongly intersects with the concept of moral desert.  Due to its pervasiveness in our intuitions and how we perceive other human beings and its importance in moral theory in general, people should spend a lot more time critically reflecting on this concept.

In the next part of this post series, I’m going to talk about the conflict between faith and doubt, perhaps the most ubiquitous theme found in The Brothers Karamazov, and how it ties all of these other concepts together.

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“The Brothers Karamazov” – A Moral & Philosophical Critique (Part II)

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In my last post in this series, concerning Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, I talked about the concept of good and evil and the character Ivan’s personal atheistic perception that they are contingent on God existing (or at least an afterlife of eternal reward or punishment).  While there may even be a decent percentage of atheists that share this view (objective morality being contingent on God’s existence), I briefly explained my own views (being an atheist myself) which differs from Ivan’s in that I am a moral realist and believe that morality is objective independent of any gods or immortal souls existing.  I believe that moral facts exist (and science is the best way to find them), that morality is ultimately grounded on objective facts pertaining to human psychology, biology, sociology, neurology, and other facts about human beings, and thus that good and evil do exist in at least some sense.

In this post, I’m going to talk about Ivan’s influence on his half-brother, Smerdyakov, who ends up confessing to Ivan that he murdered their father Fyodor Pavlovich, as a result of Ivan’s philosophical influence on him.  In particular, Smerdyakov implicates Ivan as at least partially responsible for his own murderous behavior since Ivan successfully convinced him that evil wasn’t possible in a world without a God.  Ivan ends up becoming consumed with guilt, basically suffers a nervous breakdown, and then is incessantly taunted by a demonic apparition.  The hallucinations continue up until the moment Ivan comes to find out, from his very religious brother Alyosha, that Smerdyakov has hung himself.  This scene highlights a number of important topics beyond the moral realism I discussed in the first post, such as moral responsibility, free will, and even moral desert (I’ll discuss this last topic in my next post).

As I mentioned before, beyond the fact that we do not need a god to ground moral values, we also don’t need a god or an afterlife to motivate us to behave morally either.  By cultivating moral virtues such as compassion, honesty, and reasonableness, and analyzing a situation using a rational assessment of as many facts as are currently accessible, we can maximize our personal satisfaction and thus our chances of living a fulfilling life.  Behavioral causal factors that support this goal are “good” and those that detract from it are “evil”.  Aside from these labels though, we actually experience a more or less pleasing life depending on our behaviors and therefore we do have real-time motivations for behaving morally (such as acting in ways that conform to various cultivated virtues).  Aristotle claimed this more than 2000 years ago and moral psychology has been confirming it time and time again.

Since we have evolved as a particular social species with a particular psychology, not only do we have particular behaviors that best accomplish a fulfilling life, but there are also various behavioral conditioning algorithms and punishment/reward systems that are best at modifying our behavior.  And this brings me to Smerdyakov.  By listening to Ivan and ultimately becoming convinced by Ivan’s philosophical arguments, he seems to have been conditioned out of his previous views on moral responsibility.  In particular, he ended up adopting the belief that if God does not exist, then anything is permissible.  Since he also rejected a belief in God, he therefore thought he could do whatever he wanted.

One thing this turn of events highlights is that there are a number of different factors that influence people’s behaviors and that lead to their being reasoned into doing (or not doing) all sorts of things.  As Voltaire once said “Those who can make you believe absurdities can also make you commit atrocities.  And I think what Ivan told Smerdyakov was in fact absurd — although it was a belief that I once held as well not long after becoming an atheist.  For it is quite obviously absurd that anything is permissible without a God existing for at least two types of reasons: pragmatic considerations and moral considerations (with the former overlapping with the latter).  Pragmatic reasons include things like not wanting to be fined, incarcerated, or even executed by a criminal justice system that operates to minimize illegal behaviors.  It includes not wanting to be ostracized from your circle of friends, your social groups, or your community (and risking the loss of beneficial reciprocity, safety nets, etc.).  Moral reasons include everything that detracts from your overall psychological well-being, the very thing that is needed to live a maximally fulfilling life given one’s circumstances.  Behaving in ways that degrade your sense of inner worth, your integrity, self-esteem, and that diminish a good conscience, is going to make you feel miserable compared to behaving in ways that positively impact these fundamental psychological goals.

Furthermore, this part of the story illustrates that we have a moral responsibility not only to ourselves and our own behavior, but also in terms of how we influence the behavior of those around us, based on what we say, how we treat them, and more.  This also reinforces the importance of social contract theory and how it pertains to moral behavior.  If we follow simple behavioral heuristics like the Golden Rule and mutual reciprocity, then we can work together to obtain and secure common social goods such as various rights, equality, environmental sustainability, democratic legislation (ideally based on open moral deliberation), and various social safety nets.  We also can punish those that violate the social contract, as we already do with the criminal justice system and various kinds of social ostracization.  While our system of checks is far from perfect, having some system that serves such a purpose is necessary because not everybody behaves in ways that are ultimately beneficial to themselves nor everyone else around them.  People need to be conditioned to behave in ways that are more conducive to their own well being and that of others, and if all reasonable efforts to achieve that fails, they may simply need to be quarantined through incarceration (for example psychopaths or other violent criminals that society needs to be protected from, and that aren’t responding to rehabilitation efforts).

In any case, we do have a responsibility to others and that means we need to be careful what we say, such as the case with Ivan and his brother.  And this includes how we talk about concepts like free will, moral responsibility, and moral desert (justice).  If we tell people that all of their behaviors are determined and therefore don’t matter, that’s not a good way to get people to behave in ways that are good for them or for others.  Nor is telling them that because a God doesn’t exist, that their actions don’t matter.  In the case of deterministic nihilism, it’s a way to get people to lose much if not all of their motivation to put forward effort in achieving useful goals.  And both deterministic and atheistic moral nihilism are dangerous ideas that can get some people to commit heinous crimes such as mass shootings (or murdering their own father as Smerdyakov did), because they simply cause people to think that all behaviors are on equal footing in any way that matters.  And quite frankly, those nihilistic ideas are not only dangerous but also absurd.

While I’ve written a bit on free will in the past, my views have become more refined over the years, and my overall attitude towards the issue has been co-evolving alongside my views on morality.  The main crux of the free will issue is that libertarian free will is logically impossible because our actions are never free from both determinism and indeterminism (randomness) since one or the other must underlie how our universe operates (depending on which interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is correct).  Neither option from this logical dichotomy gives us “the freedom to have chosen to behave differently given the same initial conditions in a non-random way”.  Therefore free will in this sense is logically impossible.  However, this does not mean that our behavior isn’t operating under some sets of rules and patterns that we can discover and modify.  That is to say, we can effectively reprogram many of our behavioral tendencies using various forms of conditioning through punishment/reward systems.  These are the same systems we use to teach children how to behave and to rehabilitate criminals.

The key thing to note here is that we need to acknowledge that even if we don’t have libertarian free will, we still have a form of “free will” that matters (as philosophers like Daniel Dennett have said numerous times) whereby we have the ability to be programmed and reprogrammed in certain ways, thus allowing us to take responsibility for our actions and design ways to modify future actions as needed.  We have more degrees of freedom than a person who is insane for example, or a child, or a dog, and these degrees of freedom or autonomy — the flexibility we have in our decision-making algorithms — can be used as a rough guideline for determining how “morally responsible” a person is for their actions.  That is to say, the more easily a person can be conditioned out of a particular behavior, and the more rational decision making processes are involved in governing that behavior, the more “free will” this person has in a sense that applies to a criminal justice system and that applies to most of our everyday lives.

In the end, it doesn’t matter whether someone thinks that their behavior doesn’t matter because there’s no God, or because they have no libertarian free will.  What needs to be pointed out is the fact that we are able to behave in ways (or be conditioned to behave in ways) that lead to more happiness, more satisfaction and more fulfilling lives.  And we are able to behave in ways that detract from this goal.  So which behaviors should we aim for?  I think the answer is obvious.  And we also need to realize that as a part of our behavioral patterns, we need to realize that ideas have consequences on others and their subsequent behaviors.  So we need to be careful about what ideas we choose to spread and to make sure that they are put into a fuller context.  If a person hasn’t given some critical reflection about the consequences that may ensue from spreading their ideas to others, especially to others that may misunderstand it, then they need to keep those ideas to themselves until they’ve reflected on them more.  And this is something that I’ve discovered and applied for myself as well, as I was once far less careful about this than I am now.  In the next post, I’m going to talk about the concept of moral desert and how it pertains to free will.  This will be relevant to the scene described above regarding Ivan’s demonic apparition that haunts him as a result of his guilt over Smerdyakov’s murder of their father, as well as why the demonic apparition disappeared once Ivan heard that Smerdyakov had taken his own life.

“The Brothers Karamazov” – A Moral & Philosophical Critique (Part I)

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I wanted to write some thoughts on Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, and I may end up writing this in several parts.  I’m interested in some of the themes that Dostoevsky develops, in particular, those pertaining to morality, moral responsibility, free will, moral desert, and their connection to theism and atheism.  Since I’m not going to go over the novel in great detail, for those not already familiar with this story, please at least read the plot overview (here’s a good link for that) before pressing on.

One of the main characters in this story, Ivan, is an atheist, as I am (though our philosophies differ markedly as you’ll come to find out as you read on).  In his interactions and conversation with his brother Alyosha, a very religious man, various moral concepts are brought up including the dichotomy of good and evil, arguments against the existence of God (at least, against the existence of a loving God) such as the well-known Problem of Evil, and other ethical and religious quandaries.  I wanted to first talk about Ivan’s insistence that good and evil cannot exist without God, and since Ivan’s character doesn’t believe that God exists, he comes to the conclusion that good and evil do not exist either.  Although I’m an atheist, I disagree with Ivan’s views here and will expand on why in a moment.

I’ve written a bit on my blog, about various arguments against the existence of God that I’ve come across over the years, some of which that I’ve formulated on my own after much reflection – and that were at least partially influenced by my former religious views as a born-again Protestant Christian.  Perhaps ironically, it wasn’t until after I became an atheist that I began to delve much deeper into moral theory, and also into philosophy generally (though the latter is less surprising).  My views on morality have evolved in extremely significant ways since my early adult years.  For example, back when I was a Christian I was a moral objectivist/realist, believing that morals were indeed objective but only in the sense that they depended on what God believed to be right and wrong (even if these divine rules changed over time or seemed to contradict my own moral intuitions and analyses, such as stoning homosexuals to death).  Thus, I subscribed to some form of Divine Command Theory (or DCT).  After becoming an atheist, much like Ivan, I became a moral relativist (but only temporarily – keep reading), believing as the character Ivan did, that good and evil couldn’t exist due to their resting on a fictitious or at least non-demonstrable supernatural theological foundation and/or (perhaps unlike Ivan believed) that good and evil may exist but only in the sense that they were nothing more than cultural norms that were all equally valid.

Since then, I’ve become a moral realist once again (as I was when I was a Christian), after putting the philosophy of Ivan to the test (so to speak).  I realized that I could no longer justify the belief that any cultural moral norm had as equal of a claim to being true as any other cultural norm.  There were simply too many examples of moral prescriptions in various cultures and religions that couldn’t be justified.  Then I realized that many of the world’s cultural moral norms, though certainly not all of them, were largely universal (such as prohibitions against, at least certain forms of, stealing, killing, and others) which suggested a common human psychological component underlying many of them.

I also realized that as an atheist, much as Nietzsche realized, I now had to ground my own moral views on something that didn’t rely on Divine Command Theory, gods, Christian traditions, or any other foundation that I found to be invalid, illogical, unreasonable, unjustified, or not sufficiently demonstrated to be true.  And I had to do this if I was to find a way out of moral relativism, which simply didn’t sit well with me as it didn’t seem to be coherent with the bulk of human psychology and the more or less universal goals that humans strive to achieve in their lives.  It was ultimately the objective facts pertaining to human psychology that allowed me to resubscribe to an objectivist/realist morality — and now my views of morality were no longer contingent on merely the whim or dictates of some authoritarian god (thus bypassing the Euthyphro dilemma), but rather were contingent on objective facts about human beings, what makes us happy and fulfilled and what doesn’t (where these facts often disagree with moral prescriptions stemming from various religions and Divine-Command-Theory).

After dabbling with the teachings of various philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Rawls, Foot, and others, I came to accept a view of morality that was indeed coherent, sensible, sufficiently motivating to follow (which is a must), and which subsumed all the major moral theories into one framework (and which therefore had the best claim to being true since it was compatible with all of them –  virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism).   Now I’ve come to accept what can be described as a Goal Theory of Ethics, whereby morality is defined as “that which one ought to do above all else – when rational and maximally informed based on reason and evidence – in order to increase one’s personal life fulfillment and overall level of preference satisfaction”.  One could classify this as a subset of desire utilitarianism, but readers must be warned that this is NOT to be confused with traditional formulations of utilitarianism – such as those explicitly stated by J.S. Mill, Peter Singer, etc., as they are rife with problems resulting from not taking ALL consequences into account (such as consequences pertaining to one’s own character and how they see themselves as a person, as per the wisdom of Aristotle and Kant).

So how can good and evil exist without some God(s) existing?  That is to say, if a God doesn’t exist, how can it not be the case that “anything is permissible”?  Well, the short answer is – because of human psychology (and also social contract theory).

When people talk about behaving morally, what they really mean (when we peel back all the layers of cultural and religious rhetoric, mythology, narrative, etc.) is behaving in a way that maximizes our personal satisfaction – specifically our sense of life fulfillment.  Ask a Christian, or a Muslim, or a Humanist, why ought they behave in some particular way, and it all can be shown to break down to some form of human happiness or preference satisfaction for life fulfillment (not some hedonistic form of happiness).  They may say to behave morally “because then you can get into heaven, or avoid hell”, or “because it pleases God”, or what-have-you.  When you ask why THOSE reasons are important, it ultimately leads to “because it maximizes your chance of living a fulfilled life” (whether in this life or in the next, for those that believe in an afterlife).  I don’t believe in any afterlife because there’s no good evidence or reason to have such a belief, so for me the life that is most important is the one life we are given here on earth – which therefore must be cherished and not given any secondary priority to a hypothetical life that may or may not be granted after death.

But regardless, whether you believe in an afterlife (as Alyosha does) or not (as in Ivan’s case), it is still about maximizing a specific form of happiness and fulfillment.  However, another place where Ivan seems to go wrong in his thinking is his conclusion that people only behave morally based on what they believe will happen to them in an afterlife.  And therefore, if there is no afterlife (immortal souls), then there is no reason to be moral.  The fact of the matter is though, in general, much of what we tend to call moral behavior actually produces positive effects on the quality of our lives now, as we live them.  People that behave immorally are generally not going to live “the good life” or achieve what Aristotle called eudaimonia.  On the other hand, if people actually cultivate virtues of compassion, honesty, and reasonableness, they will simply live more fulfilling lives.  And people that don’t do this or simply follow their immediate epicurean or selfish impulses will most certainly not live a fulfilling life.  So there is actually a naturalistic motivating force to behave morally, regardless of any afterlife.  Ivan simply overlooked this (and by extension, possibly Dostoyevsky as well), likely because most people brought up in Christianized cultures often focus on the afterlife as being the bearer of ultimate justice and therefore the ultimate motivator for behaving as they do.

In any case, the next obvious question to ask is what ways of living best accomplish this goal of life fulfillment?  This is an empirical question which means science can in principle discover the answer, and is the only reliable (or at least the most reliable) way of arriving at such answers.  While there is as of yet no explicit “science of morality”, various branches of science such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and neuroscience, are discovering moral facts (or at least reasonable approximations of these facts, given what data we have obtained thus far).  Unless we as a society choose to formulate a science of morality — a laborious research project indeed — we will have to live with the best approximations to moral facts that are at our disposal as per the findings in psychology, sociology, neuroscience, etc.

So even if we don’t yet know with certainty what one ought to do in any and all particular circumstances (no situational ethical certainties), many scientific findings have increased our confidence in having discovered at least some of those moral facts or approximations of those facts (such as that slavery is morally wrong, because it doesn’t maximize the overall life satisfaction of the slaveholder, especially if he/she were to analyze the situation rationally with as many facts as are pragmatically at their disposal).  And to make use of some major philosophical fruits cultivated from the works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, and Rawls (among many others), we have the benefits of Social Contract Theory to take into consideration.  In short, societies maximize the happiness and flourishing of the citizens contained therein by making use of a social contract – a system of rules and mutual expectations that ought to be enforced in order to accomplish that societal goal (and which ought to be designed in a fair manner, behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, or what he deemed the “original position”).  And therefore, to maximize one’s own chance of living a fulfilling life, one will most likely need to endorse some form of social contract theory that grants people rights, equality, protection, and so forth.

In summary, good and evil do exist despite there being no God because human psychology is particular to our species and our biology, it has a finite range of inputs and outputs, and therefore there are some sets of behaviors that will work better than others to maximize our happiness and overall life satisfaction given the situational circumstances that we find our lives embedded in.  What we call “good” and “evil” are simply the behaviors and causal events that “add to” or “detract from” our goal of living a fulfilling life.  The biggest source of disagreement among the various moral systems in the world (whether religiously motivated or not), are the different sets of “facts” that people subscribe to (some beliefs being based on sound reason and evidence whereas others are based on irrational faith, dogma, or emotions) and whether or not people are analyzing the actual facts in a rational manner.  A person may think they know what will maximize their chances of living a fulfilling life when in fact (much like with the heroin addict that can’t wait to get their next fix) they are wrong about the facts and if they only knew so and acted rationally, would do what they actually ought to do instead.

In my next post in this series, I’ll examine Ivan’s views on free will and moral responsibility, and how it relates to the unintended consequence of the actions of his half-brother Smerdyakov (who murders their father, Fyodor Pavlovich, as a result of Ivan’s influence on his moral views).

Atheism, Morality, and Various Thoughts of the Day…

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I’m sick of anti-intellectuals and the rest in their assuming that all atheists are moral Nihilists, moral relativists, post/modernists, proponents of scientism, etc. ‘Dat ain’t the case. Some of us respect philosophy and understand fully well that even science requires an epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical foundation, in order to work at all and to ground all of its methodologies.  Some atheists are even keen to some form of panpsychism (like Chalmers’ or Strawson’s views).

Some of us even ascribe to a naturalistic worldview that holds onto meaning, despite the logical impossibility of libertarian free will (hint: it has to do with living a moral life which means to live a fulfilling life and maximizing one’s satisfaction through a rational assessment of all the available information — which entails BAYESIAN reasoning — including a rational assessment of the information pertaining to one’s own subjective experience of fulfillment and sustainable happiness). Some of us atheists/philosophical naturalists/what-have-you are moral realists as well and therefore reject relativism, believing that objective moral facts DO in fact exist (and therefore science can find them), even if many of those facts are entailed within a situational ethical framework. Some of us believe that at least some number of moral facts are universal, but this shouldn’t be confused with moral absolutism since both are merely independent subsets of realism. I find absolutism to be intellectually and morally repugnant and epistemologically unjustifiable.

Also, a note for any theists out there: when comparing arguments for and against the existence of a God or gods (and the “Divine Command Theory” that accompanies said belief), keep in mind that an atheist need only hold a minimalist position on the issue (soft atheism) and therefore the entire burden of proof lies on the theist to support their extraordinary claim(s) with an extraordinary amount of evidentiary weight. While I’m willing to justify a personal belief in hard atheism (the claim that “God does not exist”), the soft atheist need only point out that they lack a belief in God because no known proponent for theism has yet met the burden of proof for supporting their extraordinary claim that “God does exist”. As such, any justified moral theory of what one ought to do (above all else) including but certainly not limited to who one votes for, how we treat one another, what fundamental rights we should have, etc., must be grounded on claims of fact that have met their burden of proof. Theism has not done this and the theist can’t simply say “Prove God doesn’t exist”, since this would require proving a null hypothesis which is not possible, even if it can be proven false. So rather than trying to unjustifably shift the burden of proof onto the atheist, the theist must satisfy the burden of proof for their positive claim on the existence of a god(s).

A more general goal needed to save our a$$es from self-destruction is for more people to dabble in philosophy. I argue that it should even become a core part of educational curricula (especially education on minimizing logical fallacies/cognitive biases and education on moral psychology) to give us the best chance of living a life that is at least partially examined through internal rational reflection and discourse with those that are willing to engage with us. To give us the best chance of surviving the existential crisis that humanity (and many more species that share this planet with us) are in. We need more people to be encouraged to justify what they think they ought to do above all else.

Transcendental Argument For God’s Existence: A Critique

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Theist apologists and theologians have presented many arguments for the existence of God throughout history including the Ontological Argument, Cosmological Argument, Fine-Tuning Argument, the Argument from Morality, and many others — all of which having been refuted with various counter arguments.  I’ve written about a few of these arguments in the past (1, 2, 3), but one that I haven’t yet touched on is that of the Transcendental Argument for God (or simply TAG).  Not long ago I heard the Christian apologist Matt Slick conversing/debating with the well renowned atheist Matt Dillahunty on this topic and then I decided to look deeper into the argument as Slick presents it on his website.  I have found a number of problems with his argument, so I decided to iterate them in this post.

Slick’s basic argument goes as follows:

  1. The Laws of Logic exist.
    1. Law of Identity: Something (A) is what it is and is not what it is not (i.e. A is A and A is not not-A).
    2. Law of Non-contradiction: A cannot be both A and not-A, or in other words, something cannot be both true and false at the same time.
    3. Law of the Excluded Middle: Something must either be A or not-A without a middle ground, or in other words, something must be either true or false without a middle ground.
  2. The Laws of Logic are conceptual by nature — are not dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature.
  3. They are not the product of the physical universe (space, time, matter) because if the physical universe were to disappear, The Laws of Logic would still be true.
  4. The Laws of Logic are not the product of human minds because human minds are different — not absolute.
  5. But, since the Laws of Logic are always true everywhere and not dependent on human minds, it must be an absolute transcendent mind that is authoring them.  This mind is called God.
  6. Furthermore, if there are only two options to account for something, i.e., God and no God, and one of them is negated, then by default the other position is validated.
  7. Therefore, part of the argument is that the atheist position cannot account for the existence of The Laws of Logic from its worldview.
  8. Therefore God exists.

Concepts are Dependent on and the Product of Physical Brains

Let’s begin with number 2, 3, and 4 from above:

The Laws of Logic are conceptual by nature — are not dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature.  They are not the product of the physical universe (space, time, matter) because if the physical universe were to disappear, The Laws of Logic would still be true.  The Laws of Logic are not the product of human minds because human minds are different — not absolute.

Now I’d like to first mention that Matt Dillahunty actually rejected the first part of Slick’s premise here, as Dillahunty explained that while logic (the concept, our application of it, etc.) may in fact be conceptual in nature, the logical absolutes themselves (i.e. the laws of logic) which logic is based on are in fact neither conceptual nor physical.  My understanding of what Dillahunty was getting at here is that he was basically saying that just as the concept of an apple points to or refers to something real (i.e. a real apple) which is not equivalent to the concept of an apple, so also does the concept of the logical absolutes refer to something that is not the same as the concept itself.  However, what it points to, Dillahunty asserted, is something that isn’t physical either.  Therefore, the logical absolutes themselves are neither physical nor conceptual (as a result, Dillahunty later labeled “the essence” of the LOL as transcendent).  When Dillahunty was pressed by Slick to answer the question, “then what caused the LOL to exist?”, Dillahunty responded by saying that nothing caused them (or we have no reason to believe so) because they are transcendent and are thus not a product of anything physical nor conceptual.

If this is truly the case, then Dillahunty’s point here does undermine the validity of the logical structure of Slick’s argument, because Slick would then be beginning his argument by referencing the content and the truth of the logical absolutes themselves, and then later on switching to the concept of the LOL (i.e. their being conceptual in their nature, etc.).  For the purposes of this post, I’m going to simply accept Slick’s dichotomy that the logical absolutes (i.e. the laws of logic) are in fact either physical or conceptual by nature and then I will attempt to refute the argument anyway.  This way, if “conceptual or physical” is actually a true dichotomy (i.e. if there are no other options), despite the fact that Slick hasn’t proven this to be the case, his argument will be undermined anyway.  If Dillahunty is correct and “conceptual or physical” isn’t a true dichotomy, then even if my refutation here fails, Slick’s argument will still be logically invalid based on the points Dillahunty raised.

I will say however that I don’t think I agree with the point that Dillahunty made that the LOL are neither physical nor conceptual, and for a few reasons (not least of all because I am a physicalist).  My reasons for this will become more clear throughout the rest of this post, but in a nutshell, I hold that concepts are ultimately based on and thus are a subset of the physical, and the LOL would be no exception to this.  Beyond the issue of concepts, I believe that the LOL are physical in their nature for a number of other reasons as well which I’ll get to in a moment.

So why does Slick think that the LOL can’t be dependent on space?  Slick mentions in the expanded form of his argument that:

They do not stop being true dependent on location. If we travel a million light years in a direction, The Laws of Logic are still true.

Sure, the LOL don’t depend on a specific location in space, but that doesn’t mean that they aren’t dependent on space in general.  I would actually argue that concepts are abstractions that are dependent on the brains that create them based on those brains having recognized properties of space, time, and matter/energy.  That is to say that any concept such as the number 3 or the concept of redness is in fact dependent on a brain having recognized, for example, a quantity of discrete objects (which when generalized leads to the concept of numbers) or having recognized the color red in various objects (which when generalized leads to the concept of red or redness).  Since a quantity of discrete objects or a color must be located in some kind of space — even if three points on a one dimensional line (in the case of the number 3), or a two-dimensional red-colored plane (in the case of redness), then we can see that these concepts are ultimately dependent on space and matter/energy (of some kind).  Even if we say that concepts such as the color red or the number 3 do not literally exist in actual space nor are made of actual matter, they do have to exist in a mental space as mental objects, just as our conception of an apple floating in empty space doesn’t actually lie in space nor is made of matter, it nevertheless exists as a mental/perceptual representation of real space and real matter/energy that has been experienced by interaction with the physical universe.

Slick also mentions in the expanded form of his argument that the LOL can’t be dependent on time because:

They do not stop being true dependent on time. If we travel a billion years in the future or past, The Laws of Logic are still true.

Once again, sure, the LOL do not depend on a specific time, but rather they are dependent on time in general, because minds depend on time in order to have any experience of said concepts at all.  So not only are concepts only able to be formed by a brain that has created abstractions from physically interacting with space, matter, and energy within time (so far as we know), but the mind/concept-generating brain itself is also made of actual matter/energy, lying in real space, and operating/functioning within time.  So concepts are in fact not only dependent on space, time, and matter/energy (so far as we know), but are in fact also the product of space, time, and matter/energy, since it is only certain configurations of such that in fact produce a brain and the mind that results from said brain.  Thus, if the LOL are conceptual, then they are ultimately the product of and dependent on the physical.

Can Truth Exist Without Brains and a Universe?  Can Identities Exist Without a Universe?  I Don’t Think So…

Since Slick himself even claims that The Laws of Logic (LOL) are conceptual by nature, then that would mean that they are in fact also dependent on and the product of the physical universe, and more specifically are dependent on and the product of the human mind (or natural minds in general which are produced by a physical brain).  Slick goes on to say that the LOL can’t be dependent on the physical universe (which contains the brains needed to think or produce those concepts) because “…if the physical universe were to disappear, The Laws of Logic would still be true.”  It seems to me that without a physical universe, there wouldn’t be any “somethings” with any identities at all and so the Law of Identity which is the root of the other LOL wouldn’t apply to anything because there wouldn’t be anything and thus no existing identities.  Therefore, to say that the LOL are true sans a physical universe would be meaningless because identities themselves wouldn’t exist without a physical universe.  One might argue that abstract identities would still exist (like numbers or properties), but abstractions are products of a mind and thus need a brain to exist (so far as we know).  If one argued that supernatural identities would still exist without a physical universe, this would be nothing more than an ad hoc metaphysical assertion about the existence of the supernatural which carries a large burden of proof that can’t be (or at least hasn’t been) met.  Beyond that, if at least one of the supernatural identities was claimed to be God, this would also be begging the question.  This leads me to believe that the LOL are in fact a property of the physical universe (and appear to be a necessary one at that).

And if truth is itself just another concept, it too is dependent on minds and by extension the physical brains that produce those minds (as mentioned earlier).  In fact, the LOL seem to be required for any rational thought at all (hence why they are often referred to as the Laws of Thought), including the determination of any truth value at all.  So our ability to establish the truth value of the LOL (or the truth of anything for that matter) is also contingent on our presupposing the LOL in the first place.  So if there were no minds to presuppose the very LOL that are needed to establish its truth value, then could one say that they would be true anyway?  Wouldn’t this be analogous to saying that 1 + 1 = 2 would still be true even if numbers and addition (constructs of the mind) didn’t exist?  I’m just not sure that truth can exist in the absence of any minds and any physical universe.  I think that just as physical laws are descriptions of how the universe changes over time, these Laws of Thought are descriptions that underlie what our rational thought is based on, and thus how we arrive at the concept of truth at all.  If rational thought ceases to exist in the absence of a physical universe (since there are no longer any brains/minds), then the descriptions that underlie that rational thought (as well as their truth value) also cease to exist.

Can Two Different Things Have Something Fundamental in Common?

Slick then erroneously claims that the LOL can’t be the product of human minds because human minds are different and thus aren’t absolute, apparently not realizing that even though human minds are different from one another in many ways, they also have a lot fundamentally in common, such as how they process information and how they form concepts about the reality they interact with generally.  Even though our minds differ from one another in a number of ways, we nevertheless only have evidence to support the claim that human brains produce concepts and process information in the same general way at the most fundamental neurological level.  For example, the evidence suggests that the concept of the color red is based on the neurological processing of a certain range of wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation that have been absorbed by the eye’s retinal cells at some point in the past.  However, in Slick’s defense, I’ll admit that it could be the case that what I experience as the color red may be what you would call the color blue, and this would in fact suggest that concepts that we think we mutually understand are actually understood or experienced differently in a way that we can’t currently verify (since I can’t get in your mind and compare it to my own experience, and vice versa).

Nevertheless, just because our minds may experience color differently from one another or just because we may differ slightly in terms of what range of shades/tints of color we’d like to label as red, this does not mean that our brains/minds (or natural minds in general) are not responsible for producing the concept of red, nor does it mean that we don’t all produce that concept in the same general way.  The number 3 is perhaps a better example of a concept that is actually shared by humans in an absolute sense, because it is a concept that isn’t dependent on specific qualia (like the color red is).  The concept of the number 3 has a universal meaning in the human mind since it is derived from the generalization of a quantity of three discrete objects (which is independent of how any three specific objects are experienced in terms of their respective qualia).

Human Brains Have an Absolute Fundamental Neurology Which Encompasses the LOL

So I see no reason to believe that human minds differ at all in their conception of the LOL, especially if this is the foundation for rational thought (and thus any coherent concept formed by our brains).  In fact, I also believe that the evidence within the neurosciences suggests that the way the brain recognizes different patterns and thus forms different/unique concepts and such is dependent on the fact that the brain uses a hardware configuration schema that encompasses the logical absolutes.  In a previous post, my contention was that:

Additionally, if the brain’s wiring has evolved in order to see dimensions of difference in the world (unique sensory/perceptual patterns that is, such as quantity, colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.), then it would make sense that the brain can give any particular pattern an identity by having a unique schema of hardware or unique use of said hardware to perceive such a pattern and distinguish it from other patterns.  After the brain does this, the patterns are then arguably organized by the logical absolutes.  For example, if the hardware scheme or process used to detect a particular pattern “A” exists and all other patterns we perceive have or are given their own unique hardware-based identity (i.e. “not-A” a.k.a. B, C, D, etc.), then the brain would effectively be wired such that pattern “A” = pattern “A” (law of identity), any other pattern which we can call “not-A” does not equal pattern “A” (law of non-contradiction), and any pattern must either be “A” or some other pattern even if brand new, which we can also call “not-A” (law of the excluded middle).  So by the brain giving a pattern a physical identity (i.e. a specific type of hardware configuration in our brain that when activated, represents a detection of one specific pattern), our brains effectively produce the logical absolutes by nature of the brain’s innate wiring strategy which it uses to distinguish one pattern from another.  So although it may be true that there can’t be any patterns stored in the brain until after learning begins (through sensory experience), the fact that the DNA-mediated brain wiring strategy inherently involves eventually giving a particular learned pattern a unique neurological hardware identity to distinguish it from other stored patterns, suggests that the logical absolutes themselves are an innate and implicit property of how the brain stores recognized patterns.

So I believe that our brain produces and distinguishes these different “object” identities by having a neurological scheme that represents each perceived identity (each object) with a unique set of neurons that function in a unique way and thus which have their own unique identity.  Therefore, it would seem that the absolute nature of the LOL can easily be explained by how the brain naturally encompasses them through its fundamental hardware schema.  In other words, my contention is that our brain uses this wiring schema because it is the only way that it can be wired to make any discriminations at all and validly distinguish one identity from another in perception and thought, and this ability to discriminate various aspects of reality would be evolutionarily naturally-selected for based on the brain accurately modeling properties of the universe (in this case different identities/objects/causal-interactions existing) as it interacts with that environment via our sensory organs.  Which would imply that the existence of discrete identities is a property of the physical universe, and the LOL would simply be a description of what identities are.  This would explain why we see the LOL as absolute and fundamental and presuppose them.  Our brains simply encompass them in the most fundamental aspect of our neurology as it is a fundamental physical property of the universe that our brains model.

I believe that this is one of the reasons that Dillahunty and others believe that the LOL are transcendent (neither physical nor conceptual), because natural brains/minds are neurologically incapable of imagining a world existing without them.  The problem then only occurs because Dillahunty is abstracting a hypothetical non-physical world or mode of existence, yet doesn’t realize that he is unable to remove every physical property from any abstracted world or imagined mode of existence.  In this case, the physical property that he is unable to remove from his hypothetical non-physical world is his own neurological foundation, the very foundation that underlies all concepts (including that of existential identities) and which underlies all rational thought.  I may be incorrect about Dillahunty’s position here, but this is what I’ve inferred anyway based on what I’ve heard him say while conversing with Slick about this topic.

Human (Natural) Minds Can’t Account for the LOL, But Disembodied Minds Can?

Slick even goes on to say in point 5 that:

But, since the Laws of Logic are always true everywhere and not dependent on human minds, it must be an absolute transcendent mind that is authoring them.  This mind is called God.

We can see here that he concedes that the LOL is in fact the product of a mind, only he rejects the possibility that it could be a human mind (and by implication any kind of natural mind).  Rather, he insists that it must be a transcendent mind of some kind, which he calls God.  The problem with this conclusion is that we have no evidence or argument that demonstrates that minds can exist without physical brains existing in physical space within time.  To assume so is simply to beg the question.  Thus, he is throwing in an ontological/metaphysical assumption of substance dualism as well as that of disembodied minds, not only claiming that there must exist some kind of supernatural substance, but that this mysterious “non-physical” substance also has the ability to constitute a mind, and somehow do so without any dependence on time (even though mental function and thinking is itself a temporal process).  He assumes all of this of course without providing any explanation of how this mind could work even in principle without being made of any kind of stuff, without being located in any kind of space, and without existing in any kind of time.  As I’ve mentioned elsewhere concerning the ad hoc concept of disembodied minds:

…the only concept of a mind that makes any sense at all is that which involves the properties of causality, time, change, space, and material, because minds result from particular physical processes involving a very complex configuration of physical materials.  That is, minds appear to be necessarily complex in terms of their physical structure (i.e. brains), and so trying to conceive of a mind that doesn’t have any physical parts at all, let alone a complex arrangement of said parts, is simply absurd (let alone a mind that can function without time, change, space, etc.).  At best, we are left with an ad hoc, unintelligible combination of properties without any underlying machinery or mechanism.

In summary, I believe Slick has made several errors in his reasoning, with the most egregious being his unfounded assumption that natural minds aren’t capable of producing an absolute concept such as the LOL simply because natural minds have differences between one another (not realizing that all minds have fundamental commonalities), and also his argument’s reliance on the assumption that an ad hoc disembodied mind not only exists (whatever that could possibly mean) but that this mind can somehow account for the LOL in a way that natural minds can not, which is nothing more than an argument from ignorance, a logical fallacy.  He also insists that the Laws of Logic would be true without any physical universe, not realizing that the truth value of the Laws of Logic can only be determined by presupposing the Laws of Logic in the first place, which is circular, thus showing that the truth value of the Laws of Logic can’t be used to prove that they are metaphysically transcendent in any way (even if they actually happen to be metaphysically transcendent).  Lastly, without a physical universe of any kind, I don’t see how identities themselves can exist, and identities seem to be required in order for the LOL to be meaningful at all.

DNA & Information: A Response to an Old ID Myth

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A common myth that goes around in Intelligent Design (creationist) circles is the idea that DNA can only degrade over time, and thus any and all mutations are claimed to be harmful and only serve to reduce “information” stored in that DNA.  The claim is specifically meant to suggest that evolution from a common ancestor is impossible by naturalistic processes because DNA wouldn’t have been able to form in the first place and/or it wouldn’t be able to grow or change to allow for speciation.  Thus, the claim implies that either an intelligent designer had to intervene and guide evolution every step of the way (by creating DNA, fixing mutations as they occurred or preventing them from happening, and then ceasing this intervention as soon as scientists began studying genetics), or it implies that all organisms must have been created all at once by an intelligent designer with DNA that was “intelligently” designed to fail and degrade over time (thus questioning the intelligence of this designer).

These claims have been refuted a number of times over the years by the scientific community with a consensus that’s been drawn from years of research in evolutionary biology among other disciplines, and the claims seem to be mostly a result of fundamental misunderstandings of biology (or intentional misrepresentations of the facts) and also the result of an improper application of information theory to biological processes.  What’s unfortunate is that these claims are still circulating around, largely because the propagators aren’t interested in reason, evidence, or anything that may threaten their beliefs in the supernatural, and so they simply repeat this non-sense to others without fact checking them and without any consideration as to whether the claims even appear to be rational or logically sound at all.

After having recently engaged in a discussion with a Christian that made this very claim (among many other unsubstantiated, faith-based assertions), I figured it would be useful to demonstrate why this claim is so easily refutable based on some simple thought experiments as well as some explanations and evidence found in the actual biological sciences.  First, let’s consider a strand of DNA with the following 12 nucleotide sequence (split into triplets for convenience):

ACT-GAC-TGA-CAG

If a random mutation occurs in this strand during replication, say, at the end of the strand, thus turning Guanine (G) to Adenine (A), then we’d have:

ACT-GAC-TGA-CAA

If another random mutation occurs in this string during replication, say, at the end of the string once again, thus turning Adenine (A) back to Guanine (G), then we’d have the original nucleotide sequence once again.  This shows how two random mutations could lead to the same original strand of genetic information, thus showing how it can lose its original information and have it re-created once again.  It’s also relevant to note that because there are 64 possible codons produced from the four available nucleotides (4^3 = 64), and since only 20 amino acids are needed to make proteins, there are actually several codons that code for any individual amino acid.

In the case given above, the complementary RNA sequence produced for the two sequences (before and after mutation) would be:

UGA-CUG-ACU-GUC (before mutation)
UGA-CUG-ACU-GUU (after mutation)

It turns out that GUC and GUU (the last triplets in these sequences) are both codons that code for the same amino acid (Valine), thus showing how a silent mutation can occur as well, where a silent mutation is one in which there are no changes to the amino acids or subsequent proteins that the sequence codes for (and thus no functional change in the organism at all).  The fact that silent mutations even exist also shows how mutations don’t necessarily result in a loss or change of information at all.  So in this case, as a result of the two mutations, the end result was no change in the information at all.  Had the two strands been different such that they actually coded for different proteins after the initial mutation, then the second mutation would have reversed this problem anyway thus re-creating the original information that was lost.  So this demonstration in itself already refutes the claim that DNA can only lose information over time, or that mutations necessarily lead to a loss of information.  All one needs are random mutations, and there will always be a chance that some information is lost and then re-created.  Furthermore, if we had started with a strand that didn’t code for any amino acid at all in the last triplet, and then the random mutation changed it such that it did code for an amino acid (such as Valine), this would be an increase in information regardless (since a new amino acid was expressed that was previously absent), although this depends on how we define information (more on that in a minute).

Now we could ask, is the mutation valuable, that is, conducive to the survival of the organism?  That would entirely depend on the internal/external environment of that organism.  If we changed the diet of the organism or the other conditions in which it lived, we could arrive at opposite conclusions.  Which goes to show that of the mutations that aren’t neutral (most mutations are neutral), those that are harmful or beneficial are often so because of the specific internal/external environment under consideration. If an organism is able to digest lactose exclusively and it undergoes a mutation that provides some novel ability of digesting sucrose at the expense of digesting lactose a little less effectively than before, this would be a harmful mutation if the organism lived in an environment with lactose as the only available sugar.  If however, the organism was already in an environment that had more sucrose than lactose available, then the mutation would obviously be beneficial for now the organism could exploit the most available food source.  This would likely lead to that mutation being naturally selected for and increasing its frequency in the gene pool of that organism’s local population.

Another thing that is often glossed over with the Intelligent Design (ID) claims about genetic information being lost is the fact that they first have to define what exactly information is necessarily before presenting the rest of their argument.  Whether or not information is gained or lost requires knowing how to measure information in the first place.  This is where other problems begin to surface with ID claims like these because they tend to leave this definition either poorly defined, ambiguous or conveniently malleable to serve the interests of their argument.  What we need is a clear and consistent definition of information, and then we need to check that the particular definition given is actually applicable to biological systems, and then we can check to see if the claim is true.  I have yet to see this actually demonstrated successfully.  I was able to avoid this problem in my example above, because no matter how information is defined, it was shown that two mutations can lead to the original nucleotide sequence (whatever amount of genetic “information” that may have been).  If the information had been lost, it was recreated, and if it wasn’t technically lost at all during the mutation, then it shows that not all mutations lead to a loss of information.

I would argue that a fairly useful and consistent way to define information in terms of its application to describing the evolving genetics of biological organisms would be to describe it as any positive correlation between the functionality that the genetic sequences code for and the attributes of the environment that the organism is contained in.  This is useful because it represents the relationship between the genes and the environment and it seems to fit in line with the most well-established models in evolutionary biology, including the fundamental concept of natural selection leading to favored genotypes.

If an organism has a genetic sequence such that it can digest lactose (as per my previous example), and it is within an environment that has a supply of lactose available, then whatever genes are responsible for that functionality are effectively a form of information that describes or represents some real aspects of the organism’s environment (sources of energy, chemical composition, etc.).  The more genes that do this, that is, the more complex and specific the correlation, the more information there is in the organism’s genome.  So for example, if we consider the aforementioned mutation that caused the organism to develop a novel ability to digest sucrose in addition to lactose, then if it is in an environment that has both lactose and sucrose, this genome has even more environmental information stored within it because of the increased correlation between that genome and the environment.  If the organism can most efficiently digest a certain proportion of lactose versus sucrose, then if this optimized proportion evolves to approach the actual proportion of sugars in the environment around that organism (e.g. 30% lactose, 70% sucrose), then once again we have an increase in the amount of environmental information contained within its genome due to the increase in specificity.

Defining information in this way allows us to measure degrees of how well-adapted a particular organism is (even if only one trait or attribute at a time) to its current environment as well as its past environment (based on what the convergent evidence suggests) and it also provides at least one way to measure how genetically complex the organism is.

So not only are the ID claims about genetic information easily refuted with the inherent nature of random mutations and natural selection, but we can also see that the claims are further refuted once we define genetic information such that it encompasses the fundamental relationship between genes and the environment they evolve in.

Sustainability, Happiness, and a Science of Morality: Part II

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In the first part of this post, I briefly went over some of the larger problems that our global society is currently facing, including the problem of overpopulation and the overall lack of environmental and economic sustainability.  I also mentioned some of the systematic and ideological (including religious and political) barriers that will need to be overcome before we can make any considerable progress in obtaining a sustainable future.

Although it may seem hopeless at times, I believe that we human beings – despite our cognitive biases and vulnerability to irrational and dogmatic behaviors – have an innate moral core in common that is driven by the incentive to increase our level of overall satisfaction and fulfillment in life. When people feel like they are living more fulfilling lives, they want to continue if not amplify the behavior that’s leading to that satisfaction. If a person is shown ways that lead to greater satisfaction and they are able to experience even a slight though noticeable improvement as a result of those prescriptions, I believe that even irrational and dogmatic people do begin to explore outside of their ideological box.

More importantly however, if everyone is shown that their level of satisfaction and fulfillment in life is ultimately a result of their doing what they feel they ought to do above all else (which is morality in a nutshell), then they can begin to recognize the importance and efficacy of basing those oughts on well-informed facts about the world. In other words, people can begin to universally derive every moral ought from a well-informed is, thus formulating their morality based on facts and empirical data and grounded on reason – as opposed to basing their morality on dogmatic and other unreliable beliefs in the supernatural. It’s easy for people to disagree on morals that are based on dogma and the supernatural, because those supernatural beliefs and sources of dogma vary so much from one culture and religion to another, but morals become common if not universal (in at least some cases) when they are based on facts about the world (including objective physical and psychological consequences not only for the person performing the moral action, but also for anyone on the receiving end of that moral action).

Moral Imperatives & Happiness

Science has slowly but surely been uncovering (or at least better approximating) what kinds of behaviors lead to the greatest levels of happiness and overall satisfaction in the collective lives of everyone in society. Since all morals arguably reduce to a special type of hypothetical imperative (i.e. if your fundamental goal is X, then you ought to do Y above all else), and since all goals ultimately reduce to the fundamental goal of increasing one’s life satisfaction and fulfillment, then there exist objective moral facts, whereby if they were known, they would inform a person of which behaviors they ought to do above all else in order to increase their happiness and fulfillment in life. Science may never be able to determine exactly what these objective moral facts are, but it is certainly logical to assume that they exist, namely some ideal set of behaviors for people (at least, those that are sane and non-psychopathic) which, if we only knew what those ideal behaviors were, they would necessarily lead to maximized satisfaction within every person’s life (a concept that has been proposed by many philosophers, and one which has been very well defended in Richard Carrier’s Goal Theory of Ethics).

What science can do however, and arguably what it has already been doing, is to continue to better approximate what these objective moral facts are as we accumulate more knowledge and evidence in psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and even other fields such as economics. What science appears to have found thus far is (among other things) a confirmation of what Aristotle had asserted over two thousand years ago, namely the importance of cultivating what have often been called moral virtues (such as compassion, honesty, and reasonableness), in order to achieve what the Greeks called eudaimonia, or an ultimate happiness with one’s life. This makes perfect sense because cultivating these virtues leads to a person feeling good while exercising behaviors that are also beneficial to everyone else, so then benefiting others is rarely if ever going to feel like a chore (which is an unfortunate side-effect of exclusively employing the moral duty mentality under Kant’s famous deontological ethical framework). Combine this virtue cultivation with the plethora of knowledge about the consequences of our actions that the sciences have been accumulating, thus integrating in John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian or teleological/consequentialist ethical framework, and then we have a good ethical framework that should work very effectively in leading us toward a future where more and more people are happy, fulfilled, and doing what is best for sustaining that happiness in one another, including sustaining the environment that their happiness is dependent on.

A Science of Morality

To give a fairly basic but good example of where science is leading us in terms of morality, consider the fact that science has shown that when people try to achieve ever-increasing levels of wealth at the expense of others, they are doing so because those people believe that wealth will bring them the most satisfaction in life, and thus they believe that maximizing that wealth will bring maximal happiness. However, this belief is incorrect for a number of reasons. For one, studies in psychology have shown that there is a diminishing return of happiness when one increases their income and wealth – which sharply diminishes once a person exceeds an income of about $70K per year (in U.S. dollars / purchasing power). So the idea that increasing one’s income or wealth will indefinitely increase their happiness isn’t supported by the evidence. At best, it has a limited effect on happiness that only works up to a point.

Beyond this, psychology has also shown that there are much more effective ways of increasing happiness, such as cultivating the aforementioned virtues (e.g. compassion, integrity, honesty, reasonableness, etc.) and exercising them while helping others, which leads to internal psychological benefits (which neuroscience can and has quantified to some degree) and also external sociological benefits such as the formation of meaningful relationships which in turn provide even more happiness over time. If we also take into account the amount of time and effort often required to earn more income and wealth (with the intention of producing happiness), it can be shown that the time and effort would have been better spent on trying to form meaningful relationships and cultivating various virtues. Furthermore, if those people gaining wealth could see first hand the negative side-effects that their accumulation of wealth has on many others (such as increased poverty), then doing so would no longer make them as happy. So indeed it can be shown that their belief of what they think maximizes their satisfaction is false, and it can also be shown that there are in fact better ways to increase their happiness and life satisfaction more than they ever thought possible. Perhaps most importantly, it can be shown that the ways to make them happiest also serve to make everyone else happier too.

A Clear Path to Maximizing (Sustainable) Happiness

Perhaps if we begin to invest more in the development and propagation of a science of morality, we’ll start to see many societal problems dissolve away simply because more and more people will begin to realize that the reason why we all think that certain actions are moral actions (i.e. that we ought to do them above all else), is because we feel that doing those actions brings us the most happy and fulfilling lives. If people are then shown much more effective ways that they can increase their happiness and fulfillment, including by maximizing their ability to help others achieve the same ends, then they’re extremely likely to follow those prescribed ways of living, for it could be shown that not doing so would prevent them from gaining the very maximal happiness and fulfillment that they are ultimately striving for. The only reason people wouldn’t heed such advice then is because they are being irrational, which means we need to simultaneously work on educating everyone about our cognitive biases, how to spot logical fallacies and avoid making them, etc.  So then solving society’s problems, such as overpopulation, socioeconomic inequality, or unsustainability, boils down to every individual as well as the collective whole accumulating as many facts as possible about what can maximize our life satisfaction (both now and in the future), and then heeding those facts to determine what we ought to do above all else to achieve those ends.  This is ultimately an empirical question, and a science of morality can help us discover what these facts are.